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  Abstract	  
Democratic	  professionalism	  is	  as	  much	  a	  practice	  as	  it	  is	  a	  constellation	  of	  values,	  a	  practice	  that	  is	  built	  around	  
models	  of	  active	  and	  collaborative	  democratic	  change.	  	  One	  of	  the	  many	  problems	  inherent	  in	  democratic	  
professionalism	  is	  that	  professionals	  may	  engage	  only	  in	  technocratic	  professionalism	  (concerned	  with	  technical	  
self-­‐interested	  practices	  and	  motivations	  driven	  by	  commercial	  profit	  only)	  instead	  of	  civic	  professionalism,	  which	  
invests	  professional	  practice	  with	  moral	  meaning	  and	  with	  democratic	  value.	  	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  argues,	  first,	  that	  Dewey's	  form	  of	  educational	  praxis	  is	  one	  method	  by	  which	  we	  can	  encourage	  
democratic	  professionalism;	  and	  that	  a	  key	  element	  of	  our	  approach	  should	  be	  the	  Deweyan	  concern	  with	  
‘associated	  life’	  and	  'associated	  thought',	  namely	  the	  cultural	  and	  social	  forms	  of	  professional	  association,	  and	  
the	  forms	  and	  patterns	  of	  social	  thinking	  that	  professionals	  undertake	  in	  practice.	  Second,	  Dewey’s	  concerns	  
were	  central	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  Scottish	  Enlightenment	  literati,	  and	  their	  work	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  problems	  of	  
technicist	  professionalism.	  	  Third,	  and	  moving	  from	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  to	  the	  early	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  the	  
internet	  offers	  us	  significant	  opportunities	  to	  engage	  in	  new	  forms	  of	  social	  and	  educational	  engagement,	  and	  
particularly	  in	  online	  games	  and	  forms	  of	  social	  software.	  	  Two	  case	  studies	  are	  offered.	  	  The	  first	  describes	  a	  
regulatory	  initiative	  to	  embody	  Deweyan	  forms	  of	  associated	  life,	  while	  the	  second	  describes	  an	  educational	  
initiative	  that	  attempts	  to	  embody	  Dewey’s	  value	  of	  associated	  thinking.	  	  	  
	  
	  
‘Individuals	  will	  always	  be	  the	  centre	  and	  
consummation	  of	  experience,	  but	  what	  the	  individual	  
actually	  is	  in	  his	  life	  experience	  depends	  upon	  the	  
nature	  and	  movement	  of	  associated	  life’.	  	  	  
(Dewey	  LW	  14,	  91)	  
	  
[E]xcellence	  can	  only	  be	  motivated,	  it	  cannot	  be	  
coerced.	  	  
(Stronach	  2002,	  138)	  
	  Introduction	  
As	  Abel	  demonstrates	  so	  well,	  the	  complex	  relationship	  of	  democracy	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  
professionalism	  is	  highly	  contested	  within	  the	  legal	  profession	  (Abel	  2003).	  	  In	  legal	  
education,	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  professionalism	  has	  been	  under-­‐
developed,	  not	  just	  in	  theory	  but	  in	  educational	  practice	  as	  well.	  	  It	  should	  come	  as	  no	  
surprise:	  both	  domains	  are	  historically	  contingent	  and	  highly	  contested,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  
foundational	  body	  of	  theory	  bridging	  them.	  	  Mainstream	  undergraduate	  programmes	  will	  
contain	  analyses	  of	  the	  place	  of	  law	  in	  democratic	  societies,	  and	  there	  are	  of	  course	  syllabi	  
on	  professionalism,	  often	  in	  modules	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  place	  of	  the	  legal	  profession	  in	  
society.	  	  In	  postgraduate	  vocational	  courses	  generally	  there	  is	  by	  contrast	  a	  focus	  on	  
technical	  aspects	  of	  legal	  practice,	  often	  dealing	  quite	  narrowly	  with	  a	  set	  of	  regulations	  as	  
they	  apply	  to	  technical	  practice	  –	  conflict	  of	  interest,	  confidentiality	  and	  the	  like.	  But	  very	  
few	  undergraduate	  and	  vocational	  programmes,	  for	  a	  range	  of	  complex	  reasons,	  give	  a	  
broad	  view	  of	  professionalism	  and	  democracy.	  	  While	  there	  is	  critique	  (see	  for	  instance	  





result	  becomes	  invisible	  to	  students.	  	  Nor	  is	  it	  sufficient	  to	  say	  of	  the	  constellation	  of	  values	  
around	  professionalism	  and	  democracy	  that	  it	  can	  only	  be	  ‘caught’	  within	  professional	  
practice	  rather	  than	  learned	  and	  taught	  within	  educational	  programmes.	  	  If	  we	  are	  
introducing	  students	  to	  legal	  professional	  and	  ethical	  values	  as	  an	  essential	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  
justice	  in	  society,	  it	  might	  be	  legitimately	  asked	  of	  us	  where	  concomitant	  values	  appear	  in	  
our	  programmes	  and	  methods.	  	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  we	  should	  critique	  and	  practise	  
versions	  of	  the	  values	  of	  critical	  professionalism	  in	  our	  programmes	  and	  in	  our	  educational	  
practices.	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  literature	  of	  professionalism	  there	  is	  a	  movement	  to	  begin	  to	  analyze	  why	  and	  how	  
this	  invisibility	  might	  have	  come	  about.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Larson	  (1977),	  Nelson	  &	  
Trubek	  (1992)	  and	  Abel	  (2003)	  on	  professionalism,	  commentators	  such	  as	  Pellegrino	  et	  al	  
(1991),	  Dzur	  (2002)	  and	  above	  all	  Sullivan	  (2004)	  have	  shown	  how	  normative	  assumptions	  
concerning	  the	  relationship	  of	  ethics	  and	  professionalism	  need	  to	  be	  re-­‐thought,	  and	  not	  
just	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  profession,	  but	  also	  in	  educational	  processes.	  	  Sullivan	  identified	  the	  
importance	  of	  integrity,	  security	  and	  democracy	  to	  the	  whole	  professional	  project	  –	  
integrity,	  in	  terms	  of	  personal	  fulfilment	  and	  public	  recognition;	  security,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
ever-­‐evolving	  pact	  struck	  with	  society	  as	  regards	  remuneration,	  trust	  and	  social	  good;	  and	  
democracy,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  interface	  that	  can	  be	  developed	  between	  technical	  processes	  in	  
society	  generally	  and	  the	  political	  and	  moral	  processes	  that	  underlie	  them.	  	  Sullivan	  
contrasts	  technocratic	  professionalism	  (concerned	  with	  technical	  self-­‐interested	  practices	  
and	  motivations	  driven	  by	  commercial	  profit	  only)	  with	  civic	  professionalism,	  which	  invests	  
professional	  practice	  with	  moral	  meaning	  and	  with	  democratic	  value.	  	  	  
	  
Dzur	  goes	  further	  and	  in	  a	  helpful	  comparison	  of	  de	  Tocqueville,	  Dewey,	  Sullivan	  and	  Fischer	  
analyzes	  what	  democratic	  professionalism	  might	  consist	  of.	  	  He	  defined	  its	  values	  over	  
against	  its	  shadow,	  namely	  technocratic	  professionalism.	  His	  critique	  is	  worth	  quoting	  in	  
detail:	  
If	  the	  ideal	  of	  democratic	  professionalism	  is	  so	  beneficial,	  then	  why	  is	  it	  losing	  to	  the	  
technocratic	  model?	  	  An	  obvious	  reply	  is	  that	  the	  latter	  fits	  neatly	  into	  the	  
rationalized	  procedures	  and	  needs	  for	  predictability	  and	  control	  found	  in	  modern	  
economic	  and	  political	  organization.	  	  Further,	  those	  trained	  for	  professions	  currently	  
have	  minimal	  instruction	  in	  the	  democratic	  consequences	  of	  their	  professional	  
domains.	  	  Applied	  ethics	  instruction	  abounds,	  of	  course,	  and	  more	  so	  with	  every	  
passing	  year.	  	  Yet	  the	  explicitly	  democratic	  values	  of	  lay	  participation	  and	  task-­‐
sharing	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  rarely	  part	  of	  the	  ethics	  seminars	  required	  in	  
nearly	  all	  professional	  training	  curricula.	  	  	  
What	  is	  interesting	  about	  Dzur’s	  approach	  here,	  though,	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  what	  one	  might	  term	  
pragmatic	  or	  situationist	  approaches	  to	  democratic	  professionalism	  within	  an	  educational	  
context.	  	  Dzur	  talks	  here	  of	  ethics	  and	  seminars	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  whole	  stream	  of	  
educational	  literature	  (stemming	  ironically	  enough	  from	  Dewey)	  which	  argues,	  broadly,	  that	  
talk	  about	  ethics	  is,	  educationally,	  important	  but	  insufficient:	  much	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  
to	  enact	  ethics	  within	  educational	  contexts.	  	  	  
	  
Just	  what	  could	  be	  done,	  and	  the	  place	  of	  the	  moral	  imagination	  in	  the	  project,	  is	  the	  subject	  
of	  this	  chapter.	  	  I	  would	  like	  to	  examine	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  involved	  in	  dealing	  with	  moral	  
imagination	  with	  reference	  to	  professionalism,	  and	  how	  we	  might	  approach	  the	  
transformation	  of	  professionalism	  into	  democratic	  professionalism	  by	  taking	  the	  approach	  








Figure	  1:	  three	  levels	  of	  engagement	  
	  
In	  this	  chapter	  we	  shall	  start	  with	  some	  of	  the	  values	  described	  generally	  at	  level	  one	  and	  
work	  our	  way	  down;	  but	  as	  I	  hope	  to	  show,	  the	  approach	  is	  the	  opposite	  of	  a	  one-­‐way	  
street.	  	  Educational	  intention	  and	  performances	  are	  always	  in-­‐tension	  activities,	  moving	  
constantly	  and	  inescapably	  between	  the	  three	  levels	  of	  Figure	  1.	  	  Aspirational	  values	  are	  
central	  to	  almost	  all	  educational	  implementations.	  	  Biggs’	  concept	  of	  alignment	  is	  one	  
metaphor	  for	  this	  (Biggs	  1999).	  	  I	  prefer	  the	  more	  organic	  one	  of	  ecological	  balance,	  which	  
can	  include	  aspects	  of	  values,	  culture	  and	  intellectual	  history.	  	  An	  ecology	  is	  never	  static,	  and	  
it	  is	  often	  dependent	  not	  on	  the	  survival	  of	  what	  might	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  higher	  entities,	  
but	  on	  the	  survival	  and	  evolution	  of	  all	  entities	  in	  the	  ecosphere	  (see	  for	  example	  Nardi	  &	  





and	  the	  higher	  level	  values	  begin	  to	  be	  eroded.	  	  Ignore	  the	  values	  at	  the	  top	  end,	  and	  the	  
tools	  at	  the	  lower	  end	  become	  the	  perfect	  instruments	  of	  a	  value-­‐neutral	  approach	  to	  
lawyering	  that	  is	  replete	  with	  values	  (often	  corporatist	  or	  consumerist),	  critiqued	  in	  so	  much	  
of	  the	  literature	  on	  lawyering	  and	  legal	  education,	  particularly	  in	  the	  USA.	  	  A	  central	  figure	  in	  
this	  approach	  is	  the	  educationalist	  and	  philosopher,	  John	  Dewey,	  for	  whom	  philosophy	  and	  
education	  were	  almost	  synonymous.	  	  
	  Deweyan	  educational	  praxis	  
What	  is	  particularly	  appealing	  about	  Dewey’s	  oeuvre	  to	  any	  analysis	  of	  moral	  imagination	  
and	  education	  is	  the	  primacy	  he	  gives	  to	  experiential	  learning.	  	  For	  Dewey,	  learning	  is	  a	  
social	  process:	  as	  he	  points	  out	  in	  Experience	  and	  Nature,	  the	  achievement	  of	  social	  ends	  
cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  prior	  rational	  self-­‐interest	  alone.	  	  Human	  learning	  is	  inevitably	  drawn	  
to	  the	  social	  sphere	  where	  it	  enacts	  itself	  and	  becomes	  more	  sophisticated	  and	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  more	  open	  to	  change	  and	  improvement:	  
Experience	  is	  the	  result,	  the	  sign,	  and	  the	  reward	  of	  that	  interaction	  of	  organism	  and	  
environment	  which,	  when	  it	  is	  carried	  to	  the	  full,	  is	  a	  transformation	  of	  interaction	  
into	  participation	  and	  communication.	  (LW	  10	  28)1	  
Learning	  is	  experience,	  then,	  and	  throughout	  his	  career	  Dewey	  returned	  again	  and	  again	  to	  
explore	  the	  nexus	  of	  learning,	  experience,	  participation	  and	  communication.	  	  In	  legal	  
education	  experiential	  learning	  (something	  of	  a	  tautology	  for	  Dewey)	  can	  be	  the	  foundation	  
for	  the	  development	  both	  of	  professionalism	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  democratic	  behaviour,	  
whether	  in	  clinic,	  simulation	  or	  in	  some	  other	  pedagogy.	  	  But	  as	  Dewey	  realised,	  
commitment	  to	  democracy	  means	  embodying	  that	  commitment	  in	  the	  educational	  forms	  
and	  values	  we	  use	  everyday	  within	  education.	  	  Ralph	  Sleeper	  makes	  this	  point	  well:	  what	  
mattered	  for	  Dewey	  in	  all	  human	  activity,	  he	  observed,	  was	  ‘the	  emergence	  of	  logical	  forms	  
from	  the	  practice	  of	  inquiry’	  (Sleeper	  1986,	  202).	  	  Dewey’s	  radical	  form	  of	  Pragmatism	  
possessed	  a	  ‘ground-­‐map	  whereby	  [social]	  inequities	  could	  be	  identified	  and	  diagnosed,	  as	  
well	  as	  a	  method	  for	  resolving	  them’	  (202).	  	  It	  is	  also	  a	  map	  for	  educational	  transformation,	  
as	  radical	  now	  as	  it	  was	  over	  a	  century	  ago	  in	  Dewey’s	  Chicago	  Laboratory	  School.	  	  	  
	  
As	  Laurel	  Tanner	  (1997)	  shows	  in	  her	  fine	  study	  of	  the	  origins	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  
Laboratory	  School,	  Dewey	  recognised	  the	  importance	  of	  collaboration	  and	  of	  mutuality.	  	  The	  
School’s	  teachers	  played	  key	  roles	  in	  developing	  Dewey’s	  curriculum	  plan:	  their	  ‘associated	  
life’	  (see	  epigraph)	  stemmed	  from	  their	  ‘associated	  thought’	  as	  professionals	  within	  an	  
organization;	  and	  the	  relationship	  was	  deeply	  democratic.	  	  As	  Dewey	  put	  it,	  
All	  those	  who	  are	  affected	  by	  social	  institutions	  must	  have	  a	  share	  in	  producing	  and	  
managing	  them.	  	  The	  two	  facts	  that	  each	  one	  is	  influenced	  in	  what	  he	  does	  and	  
enjoys	  and	  in	  what	  he	  becomes	  by	  the	  institutions	  under	  which	  he	  lives,	  and	  that	  
therefore	  he	  shall	  have,	  in	  a	  democracy,	  a	  voice	  in	  shaping	  them,	  are	  the	  passive	  and	  
active	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  fact.	  (LW	  11	  217-­‐8)	  
	  
Linked	  with	  the	  associated	  life	  is	  ‘associated	  thought’	  (Dewey,	  LW	  5	  10)	  –	  which	  as	  Dzur	  
interprets	  it	  (2002,	  16),	  is	  collaborative	  working,	  particularly	  the	  collaborative	  problem-­‐
solving	  that	  Dewey	  especially	  prized	  as	  a	  heuristic	  in	  the	  Laboratory	  School	  (Tanner,	  83).	  	  
Dewey’s	  interest	  in	  the	  social	  context	  of	  learning	  was	  one	  aspect	  of	  a	  more	  general	  interest,	  
among	  American	  commentators	  in	  the	  1890s,	  in	  the	  nature	  and	  function	  of	  sympathy.	  	  J.H.	  
Mead’s	  theory	  of	  the	  self	  was,	  as	  he	  acknowledged,	  a	  theory	  of	  sympathy	  (Leys	  1993),	  while	  
Addams	  and	  William	  James	  also	  explored	  this.	  	  It	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  Mead’s	  social	  interactionism	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  All	  references	  to	  Dewey’s	  work	  are	  to	  the	  standard	  critical	  edition,	  The	  Collected	  Works	  of	  John	  Dewey,	  edited	  





(Joas	  1985,	  1997),	  as	  it	  was	  for	  Dewey.2	  	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  section	  the	  intellectual	  
and	  cultural	  history	  of	  associated	  thought,	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  moral	  imagination	  are	  grounded	  
in	  Scottish	  Enlightenment	  values,	  as	  are	  a	  number	  of	  important	  elements	  of	  the	  concepts	  
used	  in	  the	  debates	  surrounding	  professionalism.	  	  	  
	  
	  Moral	  imagination	  and	  associated	  thought.	  	  	  
The	  moral	  imagination	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  associated	  thought	  for	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  the	  
sympathetic	  construction	  of	  the	  other.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  associated	  thought	  derives,	  at	  least	  
in	  the	  modern	  period,	  from	  the	  Scottish	  Enlightenment	  debates	  concerning	  the	  nature	  and	  
function	  of	  the	  moral	  sense.	  	  We	  can	  see	  this	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Adam	  Ferguson,	  Francis	  
Hutcheson	  and	  Adam	  Smith,	  amongst	  others.	  	  Ferguson’s	  view	  of	  the	  moral	  imagination	  was	  
linked	  to	  the	  moral	  sense.	  	  He	  agreed	  with	  other	  literati	  on	  the	  Stoic	  position,	  contra	  Hobbes	  
and	  Rousseau:	  civic	  virtues	  were	  central	  to	  society,	  and	  emanated	  from	  knowledge	  of	  duty,	  
conscience	  and	  social	  position	  (Haakonssen	  1990).3	  	  More	  than	  most,	  he	  emphasized	  that	  
individual	  virtue	  contributed	  to	  the	  wider	  social	  good:	  ‘the	  immediate	  uses	  of	  moral	  law	  are	  
choice,	  practice	  and	  conduct’	  (Ferguson	  1978,	  6).	  	  Ferguson	  therefore	  recommended	  social	  
activism,	  participation	  in	  public	  and	  political	  life	  and,	  remarkably,	  the	  development	  of	  
education	  in	  civics	  in	  schools	  (Hill	  2006,	  216;	  219-­‐20).	  	  Ferguson’s	  view	  of	  moral	  cognitivism	  
is	  highly	  social,	  but	  as	  with	  much	  of	  his	  thought	  it	  exists	  in	  tension.	  	  He	  emphasizes	  that	  
social	  action	  is	  the	  result	  of	  moral	  agents	  acting	  on	  the	  world,	  and	  he	  held	  that,	  as	  moral	  
agents,	  we	  act	  through	  self-­‐discovery	  and	  self-­‐emergence	  in	  daily	  practices,	  habits	  and	  
interaction	  (Maharg	  2007b,	  107;	  Hill	  2006,	  143).	  	  	  
	  
Ferguson’s	  view	  of	  social	  action	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  Hutcheson’s	  ‘moral	  sense’,	  
which	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  philosophic	  and	  cognitive	  category	  but	  an	  aesthetic	  one,	  too.4	  	  
Hutcheson’s	  moral	  sense,	  literally	  a	  sense,	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  merely	  a	  version	  of	  eighteenth	  
century	  faculty	  psychology,	  but	  it	  is	  more	  subtle	  than	  that.	  	  Hutcheson	  held	  that	  beneficence	  
and	  the	  perception	  of	  virtue	  are	  acts	  of	  cognition	  and	  affect	  primarily,	  but	  they	  are	  also,	  
inevitably,	  legal	  and	  political	  in	  their	  nature	  and	  consequences.	  	  That	  they	  are	  so	  is	  
promoted	  in	  society	  because,	  according	  to	  Hutcheson,	  all	  our	  civil	  institutions	  including	  legal	  
institutions	  and	  universities,	  require	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  virtue	  and	  self-­‐fulfilment	  of	  all.5	  	  
This	  belief	  Hutcheson	  would	  have	  encountered	  in	  Stoic	  sources,	  though	  as	  Hannah	  Arendt	  
pointed	  out,	  there	  is	  an	  earlier	  source	  in	  Plato.6	  	  	  
	  
Contradicting	  Rousseau,	  Hutcheson	  defined	  the	  moral	  sense	  as	  a	  key	  sense	  for	  the	  
apperception	  of	  the	  link	  between	  learning	  and	  virtue	  (Hill	  2006,	  199,	  n.	  1278).	  	  The	  aesthetic	  
quality	  is	  important:	  as	  Kivy	  points	  out,	  Hutcheson’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  role	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  As	  Dewey	  put	  it	  in	  a	  piece	  entitled	  ‘The	  Ethics	  of	  Democracy’,	  and	  commenting	  on	  those	  who	  would	  focus	  on	  
individual	  human	  traits	  only,	  ‘the	  non-­‐social	  individual	  is	  an	  abstraction	  arrive	  at	  by	  imagining	  what	  man	  would	  
be	  if	  all	  his	  human	  qualities	  were	  taken	  away’	  (EW	  3	  227-­‐49).	  
3	  For	  further	  comment	  see	  Marshall	  1984.	  
4	  I	  discuss	  this	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  my	  chapter	  in	  a	  forthcoming	  book	  (Maharg	  2012).	  	  	  
5	  As	  Mautner	  points	  out,	  Hutcheson	  does	  not	  deny	  the	  importance	  of	  rights	   in	  discussions	  of	  moral	  positions	  –	  
this	   is	   clear	   from	   his	   treatment	   of	   jurists	   such	   as	   Pufendorf	   and	   Grotius.	   	   However	   Hutcheson	   does	   suggest,	  
regarding	  these	  and	  other	  jurisprudential	  commentators,	  that	  their	  context	  is	  too	  narrow,	  and	  that	  the	  structure	  
and	  operation	  of	  rights	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	  within	  a	  wider	  moral	  and	  ethical	  context.	  	  Mautner	  put	  this	  well:	  	  
His	  complaint,	  one	  which	  he	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  the	  first	  to	  articulate,	  and	  which	  has	  often	  been	  heard	  
subsequently,	  is	  directed	  against	  the	  tendency	  to	  identify	  moral	  theory	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  rights,	  and	  
against	  the	  view	  that	  respect	  for	  a	  person’s	  rights	  is	  the	  only	  important	  kind	  of	  moral	  consideration.	  
(Mautner	  1993,	  53)	  
6	  As	  she	  put	  it,	  Plato	  reproached	  Pericles	  ‘because	  he	  did	  not	  “make	  the	  citizen	  better”	  and	  because	  the	  





the	  sensus	  communis	  in	  aesthetic	  matters	  pre-­‐dates	  Kant’s	  treatment	  of	  ‘aesthetic	  idea’	  and	  
the	  fusion	  of	  aesthetic	  form	  and	  content;	  and	  is	  more	  subtle	  in	  his	  resolution	  of	  the	  difficulty	  
in	  accounting	  for	  the	  source	  of	  aesthetic	  pleasure	  (Kivy	  2003,	  280-­‐82).	  	  It	  is	  so	  partly	  because	  
of	  Hutcheson’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  imagination	  as	  the	  power	  by	  which	  the	  moral	  sense	  
operates	  –	  to	  a	  considerable	  degree,	  it	  is	  still	  imaginative	  and	  aesthetic	  feeling	  that	  impels	  
the	  moral	  sense.	  	  The	  imagination	  operated	  by	  ideas	  such	  as	  fitness	  –	  a	  key	  term	  for	  
eighteenth	  century	  aesthetics	  and	  metaphysics	  –	  which	  included	  the	  perception	  of	  qualities	  
in	  an	  object	  such	  as	  proportion,	  design,	  aspects	  of	  beauty	  and	  the	  like.7	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  interesting	  that,	  as	  Brown	  observes,	  in	  his	  early	  work	  the	  moral	  sense	  springs	  from	  a	  
disinterested	  impulse	  to	  do	  good	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  while	  in	  later	  work	  it	  becomes	  more	  
social,	  affected	  by	  the	  responses	  from	  others.	  	  Later	  still,	  Hutcheson	  emphasizes	  the	  link	  
between	  the	  moral	  sense	  and	  conscience,	  with	  the	  sense	  of	  judgement	  –	  ethical,	  moral	  and	  
religious	  judgment	  –	  that	  that	  may	  entail	  (Brown	  1994,	  63-­‐4).8	  	  In	  this	  we	  can	  see	  possible	  
origins	  for	  Smith’s	  description	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  bond	  between	  morality	  and	  accountability.	  	  
As	  he	  put	  it	  (Smith	  1976),	  ‘[a]	  moral	  being	  is	  an	  accountable	  being.	  	  An	  accountable	  being,	  as	  
the	  word	  expresses,	  is	  a	  being	  that	  must	  give	  an	  account	  of	  its	  actions	  to	  some	  other,	  and	  
that	  consequently	  must	  regulate	  them	  according	  to	  the	  good-­‐liking	  of	  this	  other’.9	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  grasp	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  moral	  sense;	  but	  part	  of	  its	  problem	  is	  how	  
imagination	  operates	  in	  actuality	  to	  develop	  it.	  	  Hutcheson’s	  responses	  to	  his	  critics	  John	  
Clark	  and	  Archibald	  Campbell	  on	  the	  subject	  describes	  how	  sympathy	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  (Turco	  
1999).	  	  The	  issue	  is,	  as	  Hutcheson,	  Ferguson	  and	  Smith	  realized,	  not	  merely	  one	  of	  cognition.	  	  
It	  also	  involved	  our	  awareness	  of	  how	  the	  imaginative	  narratives	  (of	  motive,	  cause,	  event,	  
character	  and	  the	  like)	  that	  we	  create	  in	  part	  out	  of	  our	  moral	  sense	  and	  sympathy	  can	  
affect	  others.	  	  In	  the	  twentieth	  century	  Arendt	  pointed	  out	  how	  speech	  and	  narratives,	  much	  
more	  than	  philosophy	  and	  political	  economy	  tracts,	  can	  engage	  others	  in	  a	  critical	  argument	  
precisely	  because	  they	  deal	  in	  situations,	  in	  particular	  circumstances,	  and	  can	  persuade	  
listeners	  and	  readers	  to	  come	  to	  complex	  moral	  and	  ethical	  decisions	  (Arendt	  1958,	  175-­‐
88).10	  	  	  
	  
For	  Smith,	  one	  of	  the	  problematics	  of	  sympathy	  was	  how	  one	  might	  be	  at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  
time	  both	  inside	  oneself	  and	  yet	  the	  impartial	  spectator	  of	  whom	  Smith	  approves	  (Smith	  
1976,	  III.3.25).	  As	  Brown	  points	  out	  (1994,	  70)	  Smith’s	  philosophical	  voice	  is	  ‘unable	  to	  
achieve	  a	  complete	  resolution	  in	  which	  the	  sympathetic	  construction	  of	  the	  impartial	  
spectator	  achieves	  a	  state	  of	  moral	  wholeness	  for	  the	  moral	  agent’	  (Brown	  1994,	  75).	  	  I	  
agree	  with	  her	  that	  in	  Smith	  as	  in	  Hutcheson	  we	  see	  less	  of	  the	  calm	  and	  generous	  Stoic	  
citizen	  and	  more	  of	  a	  ‘fractured	  and	  struggling	  moral	  being’	  (Brown	  1994,	  75).	  	  It	  is	  a	  moral	  
being	  that	  is	  familiar	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Ferguson,	  too;	  and	  not	  because	  of	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  
Stoic	  position	  per	  se.	  	  As	  Hill	  put	  it,	  Ferguson	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  new	  economic	  and	  
moral	  conditions	  rapidly	  taking	  hold	  in	  Scotland:	  he	  ‘fretted	  about	  the	  increasingly	  important	  
role	  of	  prudential	  reasoning,	  bureaucratic	  rationality	  and	  centralised	  planning	  in	  the	  running	  
of	  societies	  and,	  in	  particular,	  their	  effects	  upon	  the	  moral	  strength	  of	  nations’	  (Hill	  2006,	  
11).	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Kivy	  points	  to	  the	  link	  between	  association	  of	  ideas	  and	  the	  perception	  of	  fitness	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  category	  (Kivy	  
2003,	  184-­‐88).	  	  See	  also	  Darling	  (1989)	  and	  Sheridan	  (2007).	  
8	  To	  a	  considerable	  degree,	  though,	  it	  is	  still	  imaginative	  and	  aesthetic	  feeling	  that	  impels	  the	  moral	  sense..	  	  See	  
Harrison	  (1995)	  for	  the	  link	  between	  imagination	  and	  easthetics	  in	  Smith,	  and	  evidence	  of	  Smith’s	  debt	  to	  
Hutcheson	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  	  
9	  Quoted	  in	  Dubnick	  (2010).	  	  	  





Hutcheson’s	  central	  idea	  of	  the	  moral	  sense	  mutated	  in	  the	  later	  eighteenth	  and	  nineteenth	  
century	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Stewart	  and	  Reid	  into	  forms	  to	  which	  he	  would	  not	  have	  assented,	  
but	  which	  were	  nevertheless	  influential	  in	  their	  own	  right.11	  	  	  The	  flexible	  links	  between	  
moral	  theory	  and	  lived	  practice	  advocated	  by	  Hutcheson,	  however,	  became	  formalised	  in	  
courses	  in	  undergraduate	  Moral	  Philosophy	  and	  Ethics.	  	  The	  Hutchesonian	  legacy	  also	  lived	  
on	  in	  a	  migrated	  form.	  	  Hutcheson’s	  ideas	  on	  beatific	  moral	  theory	  were	  significantly	  
influential	  in	  university	  and	  political	  circles	  in	  North	  America	  (Norton,	  1976).	  	  John	  Dewey	  
first	  encountered	  them	  while	  a	  student	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Philosophy	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Vermont,	  and	  he	  would	  have	  been	  familiar	  with	  constellations	  of	  Stoic	  and	  Enlightenment	  
thinking	  around	  the	  moral	  sense,	  sympathy	  and	  the	  association	  of	  ideas.12	  	  While	  he	  moved	  
well	  beyond	  them	  in	  his	  own	  philosophical	  and	  educational	  thinking,	  there	  were	  some	  ways	  
in	  which	  he	  was,	  paradoxically,	  moving	  towards	  Hutcheson,	  particularly	  in	  his	  idea	  that	  
learning	  is	  a	  social	  process.	  	  As	  he	  writes	  in	  Experience	  and	  Nature,	  the	  achievement	  of	  social	  
ends	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  prior	  rational	  self-­‐interest	  alone	  (any	  more	  than	  it	  could	  be	  for	  
Hutcheson).	  	  Human	  learning,	  including	  learning	  in	  morals,	  is	  inevitably	  drawn	  to	  the	  social	  
sphere	  where	  it	  enacts	  itself	  within	  a	  social	  context,	  and	  becomes	  more	  sophisticated	  and	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  more	  open	  to	  change	  and	  improvement:	  
[t]he	  principle	  of	  continuity	  of	  experiences	  means	  that	  every	  experience	  both	  takes	  
up	  something	  from	  those	  which	  have	  gone	  before	  and	  modifies	  in	  some	  way	  the	  
quality	  of	  those	  which	  come	  after.	  (LW,	  10,	  35)	  
	  
Learning,	  including	  learning	  in	  moral	  imagination,	  is	  also	  experience,	  then;	  and	  throughout	  
his	  career	  Dewey	  returned	  again	  and	  again	  to	  explore	  the	  nexus	  of	  learning,	  lived	  experience	  
and	  participation	  in	  imaginative	  action.	  	  It	  was	  for	  him	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  development	  
both	  of	  professional	  behaviour,	  ethical	  commitment	  and	  indeed	  the	  ground	  of	  democratic	  
action	  for	  individuals	  and	  institutions.	  	  It	  can	  be	  so	  for	  us	  in	  legal	  education,	  whether	  in	  
clinic,	  simulation	  or	  in	  any	  similar	  experiential	  pedagogy,	  where	  there	  is	  commitment	  to	  
democratic	  and	  ethical	  behaviour	  in	  the	  everyday	  educational	  ideas,	  gestures,	  physical	  
environment	  and	  abstract	  structures	  we	  surround	  ourselves	  with.	  	  	  
	  
How	  might	  these	  Deweyan	  values	  be	  explored	  and	  used	  in	  legal	  education?	  	  The	  next	  
section,	  the	  first	  of	  two	  case	  studies,	  is	  a	  study	  in	  regulatory	  change,	  one	  based	  not	  just	  on	  
Deweyan	  concepts,	  but	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  key	  Enlightenment	  ideas	  such	  as	  fitness,	  
accountability,	  and	  learning	  via	  narrative.	  	  	  
	  	  CASE	  STUDY	  ONE:	  Professional	  legal	  education	  and	  regulation	  in	  Scotland	  
If	  the	  values	  of	  professionalism	  and	  the	  interface	  between	  moral	  values	  and	  professionalism	  
are	  becoming	  an	  issue	  of	  key	  concern	  to	  educators,	  it	  is	  even	  more	  so	  for	  regulators	  of	  
professions,	  and	  not	  just	  because	  of	  high-­‐profile	  cases	  such	  as	  Enron	  in	  business,	  the	  recent	  
cases	  of	  financial	  services	  fraud,	  or	  the	  case	  of	  Harold	  Shipman	  in	  medical	  practice.	  	  
Research	  is	  focusing	  on	  what	  professionalism	  might	  be,	  how	  it	  might	  be	  taught	  and	  learned,	  
and	  how	  it	  might	  be	  measured.	  	  Papadakis	  et	  al,	  for	  instance,	  set	  out	  to	  determine	  if	  medical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  As	  Cairns	  points	  out	  (1992,	  169),	  by	  the	  mid-­‐eighteenth	  century	  natural	  law	  thinking	  had	  come	  to	  dominate	  
the	  moral	  philosophical	  curriculum	  in	  the	  Universities	  of	  Edinburgh	  and	  Glasgow.	  	  Maharg	  (2012)	  describes	  some	  
of	  influences	  of	  Hutcheson’s	  thinking	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  as	  does	  Ward	  (2002).	  
12	  For	  example	  in	  addition	  to	  reading	  the	  basic	  texts	  he	  read	  John	  Stuart	  Mill’s	  analysis	  of	  Hamilton	  (Mill	  1866).	  	  
See	  Feuer	  (1958).	  	  Dewey	  may	  even	  have	  borrowed	  the	  phrase	  from	  Dugald	  Stewart,	  who	  analyzed	  the	  effects	  of	  





students	  who	  demonstrated	  unprofessional	  conduct	  in	  medical	  school	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  
be	  disciplined	  by	  their	  State	  Board.	  	  Their	  study	  set	  out	  possible	  correlative	  factors,	  including	  
gender,	  grade	  point	  average,	  Medical	  College	  Admission	  scores,	  school	  grades,	  National	  
Board	  of	  Medical	  Examiner	  Part	  1	  scores	  and	  negative	  excerpts	  from	  evaluation	  forms.	  	  The	  
study	  subjects	  were	  alumni	  graduating	  between	  1943	  and	  1989.	  	  They	  revealed	  correlations	  
between	  unprofessional	  behaviour	  at	  medical	  school,	  and	  practitioners	  who	  had	  been	  
disciplined	  by	  their	  profession.	  	  As	  they	  reported,	  	  
We	  found	  that	  UCSF	  School	  of	  Medicine	  students	  who	  received	  comments	  regarding	  
unprofessional	  behaviour	  were	  more	  than	  twice	  as	  likely	  to	  be	  disciplined	  by	  the	  
Medical	  Board	  of	  California	  when	  they	  become	  practicing	  physicians	  than	  were	  
students	  without	  such	  comments.	  The	  more	  traditional	  measures	  of	  medical	  school	  
performance,	  such	  as	  grades	  and	  passing	  scores	  on	  national	  standardized	  tests,	  did	  
not	  identify	  students	  who	  later	  had	  disciplinary	  problems	  as	  practicing	  physicians.13	  
	  
What	  this	  and	  similar	  research	  reveals	  is	  the	  misalignment	  between	  professional	  values	  and	  
educational	  methods	  and	  assessment	  processes.	  But	  it	  also	  reveals	  two	  significant	  issues	  in	  
the	  educational	  structure	  of	  professions.	  	  First,	  the	  questions	  that	  arise	  in	  reading	  research	  
findings	  such	  as	  this	  –	  what	  constitutes	  ‘unprofessional	  behaviour’?	  	  Who	  determines	  that?	  	  
What	  are	  the	  normative	  performance	  baselines	  for	  such	  a	  concept?	  –	  need	  answering	  by	  
regulatory	  bodies	  in	  dialogue	  with	  other	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  profession,	  and	  with	  reference	  
to	  research	  on	  professionalism.	  	  For	  example	  Selznick	  (1992)	  has	  pointed	  out	  the	  need	  for	  
professionals	  to	  be	  ‘genuinely	  other-­‐regarding	  and	  constructively	  self-­‐regarding’.	  Selznick	  
goes	  on	  to	  characterize	  the	  ‘responsible	  self’	  as	  being	  manifested	  in	  three	  ways:	  character-­‐
defining	  choice,	  self-­‐affirming	  participation,	  and	  personal	  statesmanship’	  (1992,	  227).	  	  His	  
traits	  of	  the	  moral	  self,	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  those	  outlined	  by	  Ferguson	  in	  his	  Institutes,	  and	  
quoted	  earlier,	  go	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  regulatory	  enterprise	  and	  compel	  us	  to	  ask	  searching	  
questions:	  	  what	  is	  regulation?	  	  What	  is	  being	  regulated?	  	  Can	  regulation	  enforce	  moral	  
conduct?14	  	  	  
	  
Second,	  the	  critical	  literature	  on	  professionalism	  itself	  analyzes	  the	  deep	  structures	  of	  the	  
term	  as	  a	  social	  construct,	  and	  this	  needs	  to	  be	  brought	  into	  educational	  processes,	  and	  
inform	  the	  regulatory	  process.	  	  Stronach	  et	  al,	  for	  instance,	  has	  explored	  the	  nature	  of	  
professionalism,	  caught	  between	  an	  ‘economy	  of	  performance’	  and	  various	  ‘ecologies	  of	  
practice’,	  with	  professionals	  themselves	  located	  in	  the	  ‘nexus	  between	  policy,	  ideology	  and	  
practice’.	  	  They	  go	  on	  to	  critique	  the	  ‘reductive	  typologies	  and	  characterizations	  of	  current	  
professionalism’,	  and	  they	  argue	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  professional	  identities	  that	  arise	  
from	  the	  local,	  situated	  and	  indeterminable	  nature	  of	  professional	  practice,	  and	  the	  
inescapable	  dimensions	  of	  trust,	  diversity	  and	  creativity’	  (Stronach	  et	  al	  2002,	  109).	  
	  
The	  Law	  Society	  of	  Scotland	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  regulatory	  body	  that	  is	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  
these	  issues	  of	  professional	  values.	  	  The	  Diploma	  in	  Legal	  Practice,	  the	  current	  primary	  
professional	  programme	  it	  has	  regulated	  for	  over	  30	  years,	  has	  undergone	  review	  in	  a	  wide	  
consultation	  on	  the	  future	  of	  legal	  education	  in	  Scotland,	  with	  proposals	  for	  a	  programme	  to	  
be	  called	  Professional	  Education	  and	  Training	  (PEAT)	  1	  to	  replace	  it.	  	  Before	  we	  examine	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Papadakis,	  M.	  et	  al	  (2004)	  Unprofessional	  behavior	  in	  medical	  school	  is	  associated	  with	  subsequent	  disciplinary	  
action	  by	  a	  state	  medical	  board,	  Academic	  Medicine,	  79,	  244-­‐79.	  	  See	  also	  Papadakis,	  M.	  et	  al	  (2004)	  Early	  
detection	  and	  evaluation	  of	  professionalism	  deficiencies	  in	  medical	  students,	  Academic	  Medicine,	  76,	  1100-­‐1106	  
14	  Ferguson’s	  words	  are	  quoted	  on	  p.	  XXXX	  above:	  ‘the	  immediate	  uses	  of	  moral	  law	  are	  choice,	  practice	  and	  
conduct’	  (Ferguson	  1978,	  6).	  	  Selznick’s	  work	  on	  the	  moral	  content	  of	  social	  theory	  is	  based	  firmly	  in	  Dewey’s	  and	  





process	  and	  its	  outcome,	  it	  would	  be	  helpful	  to	  describe	  briefly	  the	  current	  Diploma	  
programme	  and	  the	  process	  of	  change.	  
	  
Context	  of	  the	  Diploma	  in	  Legal	  Practice	  
In	  Scotland	  until	  2011	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  routes	  to	  qualification	  as	  a	  solicitor	  or	  
advocate.	  	  It	  was	  possible	  to	  sit	  examinations	  held	  by	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  Scotland	  in	  what	  
were	  known	  as	  the	  ‘qualifying	  subjects’,	  a	  pass	  in	  which	  qualified	  the	  candidate	  to	  proceed	  
to	  a	  postgraduate	  course	  in	  professional	  subjects,	  called	  the	  Diploma	  in	  Legal	  Practice.	  	  The	  
commonest	  route	  to	  the	  legal	  profession,	  however,	  was	  via	  university	  study.	  	  In	  their	  
undergraduate	  years,	  most	  students	  studied	  for	  their	  LLB	  degree	  in	  one	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  routes	  
stretching	  from	  2-­‐4	  years,	  depending	  on	  their	  previous	  experience	  &	  pattern	  of	  study.	  	  This	  
was	  followed	  by	  the	  postgraduate	  Diploma,	  which	  lasted	  for	  around	  seven	  months	  –	  
effectively	  a	  full	  academic	  year.	  	  All	  students	  then	  entered	  a	  traineeship	  of	  two	  years	  in	  a	  
legal	  office,	  during	  which	  the	  Law	  Society	  of	  Scotland	  required	  them	  to	  undertake	  a	  
Professional	  Competence	  Course	  and,	  during	  their	  traineeship,	  to	  undertake	  the	  Assessment	  
of	  Professional	  Competence.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Diploma	  programme	  consisted	  of	  eight	  subjects	  and	  one	  option	  –	  in	  the	  Glasgow	  
Graduate	  School	  of	  Law	  (a	  joint	  graduate	  school	  between	  the	  universities	  of	  Glasgow	  and	  
Strathclyde	  –	  GGSL)	  we	  added	  another,	  namely	  the	  first	  in	  the	  following	  list:15	  
	  
1. Foundation	  Course	  in	  Professional	  Legal	  Skills	  
2. Civil	  Court	  Practice	  
3. Criminal	  Court	  Practice	  
4. Financial	  Services	  &	  Accountancy	  
5. Private	  Client	  
6. Professional	  Ethics	  
7. Conveyancing	  
8. Practice	  Management	  
9. Either	  Company	  &	  Commercial	  or	  Public	  Administration	  
	  
In	  the	  later	  1990s,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  dissatisfaction	  from	  students,	  trainees	  and	  legal	  service	  
employers,	  the	  Diploma	  curriculum	  underwent	  revision	  by	  the	  Law	  Society,	  with	  the	  result	  
that	  a	  number	  of	  skills	  were	  identified	  as	  being	  crucial	  to	  legal	  practice,	  and	  which	  had	  been,	  
hitherto,	  not	  sufficiently	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  curriculum.	  	  The	  Society	  was	  keen	  to	  see	  the	  
Diploma	  develop	  from	  what	  it	  was	  before,	  namely	  yet	  another	  academic	  course	  focusing	  on	  
substantive	  and	  procedural	  law,	  into	  a	  programme	  of	  study	  where	  attributes,	  values	  and	  
knowledge	  are	  integrated.	  	  The	  Society	  therefore	  required	  providers	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  number	  of	  








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The	  GGSL	  was	  a	  joint	  graduate	  school	  between	  the	  law	  schools	  of	  the	  universities	  of	  Glasgow	  and	  Strathclyde;	  
and	  existed	  1999-­‐2010.	  	  In	  the	  future	  PEAT	  1	  will	  be	  hosted	  separately	  by	  each	  of	  the	  two	  law	  schools.	  






From	  Diploma	  to	  Professional	  Education	  and	  Training	  (PEAT)	  programmes	  
Quite	  soon	  after	  this	  review	  process	  was	  concluded,	  however,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  little	  real	  
change	  was	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  Diploma.	  	  One	  of	  the	  many	  lessons	  learned	  from	  this	  first	  
attempt	  at	  changing	  the	  Diploma	  curriculum	  was	  the	  central	  paradox	  of	  curriculum	  design	  
and	  change	  culture:	  inside-­‐school	  reform	  needs	  to	  start	  with	  outside-­‐school	  reform.	  	  A	  
second,	  and	  much	  more	  ambitious,	  process	  of	  change	  was	  therefore	  embarked	  upon,	  one	  
that	  was	  inclusive	  of	  the	  undergraduate	  programme,	  the	  traineeship	  experience,	  
practitioner	  Continuing	  Professional	  Development	  (CPD)	  and	  stakeholder	  views.	  	  	  
	  
Early	  in	  this	  change	  process,	  a	  Working	  Party	  was	  tasked	  with	  drawing	  up	  a	  set	  of	  learning	  
outcomes	  for	  a	  new	  Diploma.	  	  The	  macro-­‐design	  envisaged	  a	  core	  consisting	  of	  
professionalism	  statements	  that	  would	  define	  the	  professional	  standards	  that	  lay	  at	  the	  core	  
of	  the	  professional	  legal	  educative	  process	  (see	  the	  Appendix	  to	  this	  chapter).	  	  Around	  that	  
were	  other	  professional	  standards	  :	  ‘Professional	  Relationships’	  focused	  largely	  on	  
professional	  relations	  in	  the	  programmes	  and	  traineeships	  (effectively	  one	  form	  of	  Deweyan	  
‘associated	  thought’),	  while	  ‘Professional	  Communications’	  was	  sub-­‐divided	  into	  areas	  such	  
as	  interviewing,	  negotiation,	  advocacy,	  etc.	  	  	  
	  
The	  outcomes,	  particularly	  Professionalism,	  were	  drafted	  with	  much	  of	  the	  research	  into	  
professionalism	  outlined	  above.	  	  It	  was	  not	  sufficient	  that	  we	  outlined	  what	  skills	  or	  
knowledge	  components	  were	  going	  to	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  PEAT	  1,	  or	  how	  they	  would	  be	  taught	  
and	  learned	  within	  the	  programme	  of	  study.	  	  We	  also	  needed	  to	  consider	  the	  moral	  and	  
ethical	  context	  of	  the	  programme,	  and	  the	  values	  underpinning	  the	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  of	  
the	  substantive	  curriculum.	  	  Instruction	  without	  moral	  context	  implicitly	  teaches	  our	  
students	  the	  impoverished	  and	  value-­‐neutral	  model	  of	  legal	  practice	  referred	  to	  above;	  and	  
many	  commentators,	  educational	  as	  well	  as	  legal,	  have	  pointed	  out	  the	  dangers	  of	  this	  
approach	  to	  skills	  learning.17	  	  As	  Ronald	  Barnett	  has	  pointed	  out,	  	  
A	  higher	  education	  designed	  around	  skills	  is	  no	  higher	  education.	  	  It	  is	  the	  
substitution	  of	  technique	  for	  insight;	  of	  strategic	  reason	  for	  communicative	  reason;	  
and	  of	  behaviour	  for	  wisdom.18	  
	  
The	  first	  value	  statement	  in	  the	  Scottish	  list	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  find	  a	  common	  ground	  to	  what	  
is	  otherwise	  incommensurable	  in	  the	  values	  of	  democratic	  commitment.	  	  Just	  what	  that	  
commitment	  might	  entail	  on	  the	  PEAT	  1	  programme	  is	  set	  out	  in	  the	  positive	  indicators;	  and	  
could	  be	  detailed	  for	  various	  future	  educational	  stages.	  	  It	  is	  not	  defined:	  the	  debate	  is	  left	  
for	  the	  profession	  to	  engage	  in,	  and	  in	  the	  open	  porous	  nature	  of	  the	  statement	  lies	  both	  its	  
strength	  and	  its	  weakness.	  	  In	  that	  debate,	  however,	  is	  the	  attempt	  to	  escape	  a	  self-­‐
referential	  professionalism,	  the	  values	  of	  which	  are	  ‘mostly	  unremarkable	  and	  
unobjectionable,	  not	  least	  because	  they	  coincide	  with	  the	  commitments	  and	  objectives	  of	  
lawyers’	  traditional	  professionalization	  project’	  (Webb	  &	  Nicolson,	  2005,	  168).	  	  Instead,	  a	  
commitment	  to	  democracy	  reaches	  out	  to	  the	  fundamental	  values	  of	  our	  society	  and	  one	  
that,	  in	  its	  recognition	  of	  the	  tension	  in	  those	  values,	  rejects	  ‘the	  possibility	  of	  the	  
conventional	  monistic	  approach	  capturing	  the	  complexity	  of	  ethical	  life’	  (Webb	  &	  Nicolson,	  
2005,	  169).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  See	  for	  example	  Toddington	  (1996).	  	  The	  problem	  of	  course	  is	  inherent	  in	  any	  professional	  programme	  –	  see	  
Stenhouse	  (1983).	  	  See	  also	  Maharg,	  P.	  (2007),	  particularly	  chapter	  four,	  ‘”By	  the	  end	  of	  this	  module…”:	  the	  
intimate	  dimensions	  of	  ethical	  education’,	  pp.99-­‐118.	  
18	  Barnett,	  R.	  (1994)	  The	  Limits	  of	  Competence:	  Knowledge,	  Higher	  Education	  and	  Society,	  Milton	  Keynes,	  Open	  





The	  Working	  Party	  therefore	  needed	  to	  define	  the	  value-­‐context	  within	  which	  skills	  would	  
be	  learned.19	  At	  the	  outset,	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  key	  issues	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  We	  refined	  
these	  as	  the	  following	  statements:	  
1. Knowledge	  and	  skills	  must	  be	  taught	  critically	  within	  the	  value	  system	  of	  the	  
profession.	  	  Values	  such	  as	  integrity,	  industry,	  service	  and	  duty,	  wisdom,	  
compassion,	  accountability	  and	  responsibility,	  all	  of	  which	  underpin	  professional	  
relationships	  and	  activities	  –	  these	  values	  were	  part	  of	  the	  essential	  context	  of	  
knowledge	  and	  skills,	  and	  had	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  as	  such.	  	  Where	  there	  was	  a	  
dissonance	  or	  clash	  of	  values,	  this	  needed	  to	  be	  explored	  honestly	  –	  indeed	  such	  
dissonance	  formed	  a	  critically	  important	  ‘learning	  moment’	  in	  the	  construction	  and	  
understanding	  of	  professional	  values	  as	  described	  by	  Stronach	  et	  al.	  	  	  
2. Knowledge	  and	  skills	  are	  part	  of	  professional	  behaviour,	  and	  professional	  behaviour	  
can	  never	  be	  taught	  in	  classroom	  activities	  alone.	  	  It	  required	  the	  presence	  of	  
practitioners,	  and	  often	  the	  setting	  of	  the	  office	  or	  the	  court	  in	  order	  to	  deepen	  the	  
learning	  process,	  even	  if	  such	  settings	  were	  proxy,	  eg	  in	  simulations.	  	  Even	  in	  office	  
and	  court,	  however,	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  professional	  behaviour	  is	  not	  only	  
taught	  overtly	  –	  it	  is	  caught	  in	  trainees’	  observations	  of	  practitioners	  at	  work,	  in	  
conversation,	  and	  at	  leisure.	  	  Similarly,	  on	  the	  PEAT	  1	  programme	  professional	  
behaviour	  is	  ‘caught’	  in	  the	  interstices	  of	  the	  curriculum.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  the	  
‘hidden	  curriculum’	  and	  the	  ‘null	  curriculum’	  of	  the	  Diploma	  are	  useful	  concepts	  –	  
that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  unintentional	  lessons	  that	  students	  learn	  from	  a	  curriculum,	  and	  
what	  is	  unofficially	  labelled	  as	  irrelevant	  or	  unimportant	  by	  its	  absence	  in	  a	  
curriculum	  (Jackson	  1968,	  353;	  Eisner	  1985).	  	  Law	  students	  learn	  professional	  
behaviours	  by	  observing	  and	  imitating	  peers,	  tutors,	  and	  other	  role-­‐models,	  not	  just	  
in	  the	  classroom	  but	  in	  hallways,	  cafeterias,	  and	  elevators.	  	  As	  the	  literature	  
suggests,	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  professional	  skills	  can	  be	  greatly	  enhanced	  by	  
active	  engagement	  with	  professional	  issues	  in	  the	  classroom	  and	  in	  simulations	  
where	  models	  of	  behaviour	  can	  be	  discussed	  to	  bring	  out	  the	  issues	  involved.	  	  	  
3. If	  we	  were	  to	  take	  experiential	  learning	  seriously	  then	  we	  needed	  to	  acknowledge	  
that	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  difference	  between	  teaching	  and	  learning.	  	  What	  a	  teacher	  
teaches	  may	  not	  be	  what	  a	  student	  learns	  from	  a	  teaching	  event.	  	  Any	  approach	  to	  
experiential	  education	  must	  start	  from	  this	  fundamental	  point.	  (Wolf	  and	  Turner	  
1989).	  	  
4. New	  practices	  on	  the	  PEAT	  1	  programme	  would	  require	  to	  be	  developed	  and	  shared	  
among	  all.	  	  We	  were	  not	  starting	  a	  course	  de	  novo,	  but	  there	  needed	  to	  be	  change	  
in	  educational	  practices.	  	  The	  relation	  between	  old	  and	  new	  practices	  made	  change	  
a	  highly	  complex	  process.	  	  There	  was	  a	  considerable	  body	  of	  existing	  practice	  at	  each	  
existing	  Diploma	  centre	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  taken	  account	  of	  in	  the	  development	  of	  
skills	  for	  the	  future.	  	  The	  course	  directors	  of	  these	  centres	  had	  a	  body	  of	  design	  
experience,	  and	  knowledge	  of	  their	  tutor	  base.	  	  The	  tutors	  had	  experience	  of	  
teaching	  and	  communicating	  with	  students;	  and	  they	  would	  probably	  have	  taught	  
with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  in	  their	  classes.	  	  The	  Society	  needed	  to	  facilitate	  
change	  in	  educational	  practices	  but	  also	  enable	  the	  shared	  experience	  within	  
centres	  to	  thrive	  and	  develop	  effectively,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  ensuring	  that	  
models	  of	  good	  practice	  were	  being	  carried	  out	  by	  all	  providers,	  both	  new	  and	  old,	  
and	  were	  applied	  with	  reasonable	  consistency	  across	  the	  range	  of	  different	  
providers.	  	  	  
5. Quality	  of	  education:	  ‘good,	  fast,	  cheap	  –	  choose	  two’.	  	  So	  goes	  the	  engineering	  
saying,	  pointing	  out	  the	  common	  sense	  relationship	  between	  these	  qualities.	  	  The	  
challenge	  for	  providers	  was	  to	  become	  genuinely	  more	  innovative	  in	  their	  design	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





teaching	  and	  learning.	  	  The	  challenge	  for	  the	  Law	  Society	  as	  a	  regulator	  was	  to	  
enable	  ways	  for	  this	  to	  come	  about,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  financial	  costs	  
of	  high-­‐quality	  professional	  education,	  and	  the	  words	  of	  Stronach	  in	  the	  epigraph:	  
‘excellence	  can	  only	  be	  motivated:	  it	  cannot	  be	  coerced’.	  
6. Student	  perceptions	  of	  their	  skills-­‐development.	  	  It	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  many	  students	  
believe	  that	  they	  are	  reasonably	  well-­‐skilled	  when	  they	  graduate,	  and	  this	  is	  true	  of	  
many	  (though	  not	  all)	  of	  them	  as	  regards	  academic	  skills.	  	  However	  it	  is	  also	  true	  
that	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  them	  will	  not	  have	  undertaken	  intensive	  skills	  training,	  or	  
used	  professional	  resources	  to	  help	  them	  learn	  the	  professional	  practice	  of	  law.	  	  
They	  needed	  to	  develop	  new	  perceptions	  of	  training	  and	  education,	  of	  legal	  skills,	  
and	  of	  their	  own	  changing	  identities	  if	  they	  were	  to	  learn	  effectively	  from	  the	  PEAT	  1	  
programme.	  	  Just	  as	  a	  culture	  change	  was	  required	  among	  teaching	  staff,	  so	  too	  it	  
would	  be	  required	  among	  students.	  
	  
If	  PEAT	  1	  really	  were	  to	  be	  a	  ‘bridge’	  course,	  then	  the	  foundations	  of	  that	  bridge	  to	  
professionalism	  were	  the	  core	  modules,	  Ethics	  and	  Standards,	  and	  Professional	  
Communications.	  	  These	  modules	  should	  declare	  to	  students	  and	  others	  that	  ethics	  are	  
regarded	  as	  critical	  to	  professional	  practice	  by	  the	  Society,	  and	  that	  effective	  communication	  
is	  a	  critical	  part	  of	  the	  ethical	  dimension	  of	  professionality.	  	  Other	  professions	  recognise	  this	  
–	  see	  for	  example	  the	  work	  of	  Hickson	  et	  al	  (1992)	  and	  others	  in	  medical	  education	  and	  
ethics.20	  	  It	  was	  also	  proof	  that	  professionalism	  was	  held	  as	  a	  key	  educational	  quality	  by	  the	  
Society	  –	  and	  again,	  there	  was	  good	  evidence	  from	  the	  Working	  Party’s	  research	  that	  other	  
professions	  had	  similar	  perspectives.21	  	  As	  regards	  communications	  outcomes,	  two	  points	  
were	  borne	  in	  mind:	  
1. The	  list	  of	  learning	  outcomes	  generated	  by	  the	  Working	  Party	  and	  the	  Consultation	  
was	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  minimum	  or	  threshold	  experience	  that	  students	  should	  have	  
had	  on	  PEAT	  1.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  students	  should	  have	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
practise	  every	  minor	  domain	  on	  this	  list	  at	  least	  once,	  and	  preferably	  twice	  or	  more,	  
with	  feedback.	  	  Providers	  were	  encouraged	  to	  innovate	  imaginatively	  and	  go	  beyond	  
the	  threshold	  skill	  set,	  ideally	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Bruner’s	  spiral	  curriculum.	  	  	  
2. Because	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  teaching	  and	  learning	  as	  we	  have	  said,	  the	  list	  
was	  not	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  prescriptive	  of	  the	  skill	  or	  knowledge	  set	  for	  a	  capable	  
trainee.	  	  Students	  themselves	  were	  to	  be	  encouraged	  to	  develop	  beyond	  the	  
outcomes.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  providers	  were	  encouraged	  to	  use	  portfolio	  learning	  in	  
order	  to	  enable	  students	  to	  develop	  not	  merely	  the	  skills	  nor	  the	  fundamental	  
values	  of	  ethics	  and	  communications	  alone,	  but	  also	  the	  student’s	  own	  developing	  
sense	  of	  professionalism	  –	  the	  Bildungsroman	  of	  professionalism.	  	  It	  was	  suggested	  
that	  the	  portfolio	  could	  link	  to	  an	  undergraduate	  personal	  development	  file,	  and	  the	  
forms	  of	  work-­‐based	  assessment	  that	  trainees	  were	  required	  to	  undertake	  as	  part	  of	  
Peat	  2.22	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  The	  medical	  educational	  literature	  is	  extensive.	  	  See	  also	  Frank,	  V.	  et	  al	  (2000)	  who	  explored	  the	  patient	  
perspective,	  ‘patients	  who	  feel	  ignored,	  deserted,	  or	  who	  suspect	  that	  there	  is	  a	  `cover	  up'	  by	  the	  medical	  
profession,	  may	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  sue.	  Failure	  to	  understand	  the	  patient	  and	  family's	  perspective	  and	  
devaluing	  their	  point	  of	  view	  have	  also	  been	  identified	  as	  common	  triggers	  for	  lawsuits.’	  
21	  See	  for	  instance	  in	  medical	  education,	  Brownell	  and	  Côté	  (2001);	  Ginsburg,	  S.,	  and	  Stern,	  D.	  (2004);	  Ginsburg	  et	  
al	  (2000);	  Papadakis,	  Loeser	  and	  Healy	  (2004a);	  Papadakis	  et	  al	  (2004b).	  	  See	  also,	  in	  the	  teaching	  profession,	  
Breger	  Calabrese	  and	  Hughes	  (2004).	  
22	  The	  development	  of	  this	  functionality	  is	  not	  a	  trivial	  task.	  	  A	  special	  working	  party	  was	  set	  up	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  
the	  Society’s	  Education	  &	  Training	  Committee	  to	  develop	  software	  and	  educational	  guidelines	  around	  the	  use	  of	  





Approaches	  to	  good	  practice	  
The	  development	  of	  professionalism	  in	  a	  course	  of	  study	  is	  never	  an	  easy	  task,	  and	  general	  
guidelines	  were	  drafted	  for	  providers	  on	  the	  following	  topics:	  
• the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  teaching	  environment	  and	  the	  available	  resources	  could	  be	  
used	  to	  structure	  student	  activity 
• types	  of	  teaching	  and	  learning,	  and	  how	  the	  mix	  of	  learning	  styles	  contributed	  to	  
knowledge	  acquisition	  and	  professional	  development	  
• how	  tasks	  and	  transactions	  could	  be	  interleaved	  and	  integrated	  with	  each	  other	  
• the	  acquisition	  and	  development	  by	  students	  of	  the	  shared	  set	  of	  terms,	  external	  
representations	  that	  provide	  a	  common	  ground	  for	  communication	  and	  shared	  
understanding	  between	  trainees	  and	  training	  firms,	  and	  between	  client	  and	  lawyer	  
There	  is	  extensive	  literature	  on	  this	  in	  medical	  education.	  	  In	  a	  series	  of	  experiments	  on	  the	  
role	  of	  biomedical	  knowledge	  in	  clinical	  reasoning,	  for	  instance,	  Boshuizen	  and	  Schmidt	  
(1992)	  have	  shown	  that	  experts	  acquire	  a	  robust	  knowledge	  base	  that	  integrates	  situated	  
and	  general	  knowledge.	  	  Knowledge	  integration	  is	  an	  active	  process	  that	  involves	  articulating	  
a	  global	  framework	  (the	  biomedical	  knowledge),	  reflecting	  on	  situated	  experiences	  
(individual	  cases	  as	  they	  are	  encountered),	  and	  actively	  making	  connections	  between	  
situated	  knowledge	  and	  the	  global	  framework.	  	  	  
	  
This	  is	  also	  true	  of	  the	  legal	  domain.	  	  A	  lawyer	  in	  private	  practice	  will	  see	  something	  in	  the	  
order	  of	  many	  thousands	  of	  cases	  in	  a	  working	  life.	  Through	  the	  experience	  of	  casework,	  she	  
gains	  an	  extensive	  stock	  of	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  mental	  schemas	  and	  performance	  
knowledge.	  	  Solicitors	  know	  this	  implicitly.	  	  When	  presented	  with	  a	  set	  of	  facts	  within	  their	  
area	  of	  practice	  they	  are	  able	  quite	  quickly	  to	  invoke	  a	  schema	  and	  can	  test	  this	  initial	  
schema	  against	  the	  evidence.	  	  Lesgold	  suggests	  that,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  an	  expert,	  a	  
trainee	  acquires	  fragments	  of	  automatized	  procedure	  that	  gradually	  become	  integrated	  into	  
extended	  sequences	  that	  guide	  performance	  (Lesgold	  et	  al	  1989).	  	  These	  sequences	  can	  be	  
formed	  quite	  slowly	  from	  practice	  through	  the	  composition	  of	  fragments	  of	  activity,	  but	  the	  
process	  can	  be	  made	  much	  more	  efficient	  if	  students	  are	  taught	  the	  procedures	  explicitly,	  as	  
a	  list	  of	  steps	  towards	  problem	  identification	  and	  solution,	  and	  taught	  also	  to	  begin	  the	  
process	  of	  case	  pattern	  recognition.	  	  These	  two	  forms	  of	  learning	  can	  bring	  trainees	  to	  a	  
practical	  knowledge	  of	  a	  transaction	  much	  more	  efficiently	  if	  learning	  is	  carried	  out	  via	  
simulation	  and	  transaction.	  	  In	  this	  respect	  what	  is	  true	  of	  biomedicine	  and	  radiology	  and	  
many	  other	  professional	  domains	  is	  equally	  true	  of	  legal	  practice.	  	  And	  as	  Stronach	  and	  
Selznick	  have	  pointed	  out,	  the	  ability	  and	  the	  freedom	  that	  professionals	  require	  in	  order	  to	  
make	  the	  link	  between	  local	  and	  global	  is	  a	  critical	  function	  of	  professionalism.	  	  The	  practice	  
of	  this	  function	  should	  begin	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  academy,	  where	  its	  education	  in	  the	  moral	  
imagination	  can	  be	  constructed.	  	  	  
	  
What	  are	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  bring	  this	  about?	  	  There	  is	  no	  one	  royal	  road,	  and	  there	  is	  much	  
literature	  about	  which	  methods	  are	  effective	  for	  which	  skills	  and	  in	  which	  teaching	  
environments	  and	  stages	  of	  learning.23	  	  Whatever	  method	  is	  used,	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  highly	  
experiential	  and	  include	  elements	  such	  as	  role-­‐plays,	  case	  studies,	  simulations,	  structured	  
interviews,	  prompted	  recall,	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  achievements	  and	  performance	  problems	  in	  
skill	  practice	  and	  the	  like.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Great	  benefit	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  intensive	  coaching	  sessions	  at	  any	  stage	  in	  PEAT	  1,	  where	  
such	  sessions	  focus	  on	  feedback	  and	  review.	  	  It	  is	  also	  the	  case	  that	  development	  in	  
professionalism	  is	  greatly	  enhanced	  if	  skills	  are	  embedded	  across	  the	  curriculum	  in	  realistic	  
transactions.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  medical	  literature	  on	  clinical	  skills	  emphasises	  the	  importance	  of	  
immediate	  feedback,	  of	  opportunities	  for	  practice	  following	  review,	  and	  of	  practice	  within	  
different	  contexts	  (Kneebone	  et	  al	  2002).	  	  Local	  course	  providers	  are	  therefore	  best	  placed	  
to	  know	  where	  to	  embed	  skills	  within	  their	  courses,	  given	  their	  knowledge	  of	  their	  tutors,	  
and	  other	  conditions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  course.	  	  However	  there	  is	  always	  a	  tension	  between	  
local	  innovation	  and	  standards	  across	  the	  jurisdiction	  and	  across	  jurisdictions.24	  	  As	  stated	  
above,	  the	  problem	  can	  be	  resolved	  if	  jurisdiction-­‐wide	  standards	  exist	  as	  threshold	  or	  
minimum	  standards,	  and	  best	  practice	  is	  shared	  collaboratively	  among	  providers.	  	  	  
	  
Above	  all,	  we	  need	  to	  return	  to	  the	  Deweyan	  value	  of	  professional	  life	  as	  associated	  life,	  and	  
embed	  that	  within	  our	  teaching	  and	  learning.	  	  If	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  first	  few	  sections	  of	  
this	  chapter	  have	  been	  at	  the	  aspirational	  level	  one	  of	  Figure	  1,	  the	  boxes	  at	  level	  two	  
describe	  examples	  of	  the	  mid-­‐level	  theory	  by	  which	  this	  can	  be	  achieved,	  and	  in	  particular	  
the	  relations	  that	  need	  to	  be	  strengthened	  between	  students	  (where	  learning,	  trust	  and	  
responsibility	  are	  built	  in	  collaborative	  activities),	  between	  institutions	  in	  the	  market,	  and	  
between	  academic	  learning	  and	  professional	  learning.	  	  Given	  the	  role	  that	  any	  regulatory	  
body	  plays	  in	  setting	  not	  just	  rules	  and	  benchmarks	  but	  tone,	  culture	  and	  relationships,	  it	  is	  
therefore	  essential	  that	  key	  professional	  concepts	  such	  as	  fitness	  and	  accountability	  are	  
defined,	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  narrow	  technicism	  of	  policy-­‐audit	  culture,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  trust,	  
openness,	  	  
	  
In	  its	  recognition	  of	  this,	  and	  in	  its	  attempt	  to	  view	  legal	  education	  as	  a	  democratic	  process,	  
one	  where	  associated	  life	  is	  of	  the	  essence	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  educational	  values,	  the	  Law	  
Society	  has	  encouraged	  a	  unique	  experiment.	  	  A	  number	  of	  providers	  came	  together	  to	  plan	  
collaborative	  inquiry	  and	  resource	  design.	  	  Current	  providers	  of	  the	  Diploma	  met	  informally	  
with	  the	  Society	  in	  2009	  to	  examine	  how	  resources,	  methods	  and	  approaches	  to	  
professional	  learning	  could	  be	  licensed	  as	  Open	  Educational	  Resources	  (OER),	  to	  determine	  
best	  approaches	  to	  the	  use	  of	  technology,	  the	  development	  of	  ethical	  learning,	  and	  consider	  
many	  other	  components	  of	  learning	  in	  associated	  lives.	  	  To	  what	  extent	  the	  initiative	  thrives	  
depends	  much	  on	  the	  relations	  between	  providers,	  of	  course,	  and	  this	  will	  take	  time;	  but	  it	  is	  
significant	  that	  the	  regulator	  has	  encouraged	  its	  existence	  and	  dynamic.	  
	  
Associated	  thought	  and	  social	  software	  
So	  far	  we	  have	  been	  discussing	  pedagogical	  approaches	  only	  to	  the	  development	  of	  
democratic	  professionalism.	  	  But	  –	  and	  bearing	  in	  mind	  Figure	  1	  above	  –	  let	  us	  take	  this	  
down	  to	  a	  further	  level	  of	  granularity	  –	  to	  applications,	  approaches	  to	  learning	  in	  detail.	  	  Can	  
technology	  play	  a	  role	  in	  enhancing	  democratic	  professionalism?	  	  If	  so,	  how	  might	  it	  do	  so,	  
and	  should	  this	  be	  part	  of	  the	  regulatory	  project?	  	  	  
	  
Recall	  the	  use	  of	  the	  moral	  imagination	  to	  develop	  the	  moral	  sense	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Hutcheson	  
and	  Ferguson;	  and	  the	  link	  between	  associated	  thought	  and	  associated	  life,	  and	  how	  this	  
was,	  as	  Tanner	  observed,	  essential	  to	  Dewey’s	  creative	  problem-­‐solving	  method	  in	  the	  
Laboratory	  School.	  	  What	  Dewey	  created,	  and	  for	  both	  students	  and	  teachers,	  was	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  In	  a	  wider	  context	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  a	  number	  of	  bodies	  in	  medical	  education	  are	  setting	  out	  to	  explore	  and	  
improve.	  	  The	  work	  of	  the	  Institute	  for	  International	  Medical	  Education	  is	  crucial	  in	  this	  regard	  (www.iime.org).	  	  
See	  for	  instance	  Schwartz	  and	  Wojtczak	  (2002);	  World	  Federation	  For	  Medical	  Education	  Task	  Force	  (2000);	  and	  





James	  Paul	  Gee	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  called	  ‘affinity	  spaces’.	  	  These	  are	  informal	  learning	  
spaces	  where	  inter	  alia,	  common	  endeavour	  is	  primary,	  where	  novices	  and	  masters	  share	  
common	  space,	  where	  intensive	  and	  extensive	  knowledge	  are	  encouraged,	  as	  well	  as	  both	  
individual	  and	  distributed	  knowledge.	  	  Gee	  goes	  on	  to	  define	  this	  in	  more	  detail	  (Gee,	  2004,	  
83-­‐89)	  using	  the	  examples	  of	  video	  games.	  	  Many	  more	  studies	  attest	  to	  this	  quality	  of	  game	  
genre	  –	  the	  research	  of	  Nick	  Yee,	  for	  example,	  or	  Constance	  Steinkuhler,	  or	  the	  research	  of	  
Henry	  Jenkins.	  	  Taylor	  (2006)	  in	  her	  fine	  study	  of	  the	  userbase	  of	  Sony’s	  EverQuest	  notes	  the	  
plethora	  of	  sites	  associated	  with	  such	  games,	  describing	  them	  as	  ‘a	  kind	  of	  “collective	  
intelligence”,	  an	  idea	  Henry	  Jenkins	  (2002)	  picks	  up	  from	  Pierre	  Levy’s	  (1997)	  work	  on	  the	  
reconfigurations	  occurring	  in	  contemporary	  society	  around	  technology	  and	  knowledge.’	  
(Taylor,	  81).	  	  	  
	  
Video	  games	  and	  social	  software	  are	  examples	  of	  such	  affinity	  spaces.	  	  Facebook	  can	  of	  
course	  be	  used	  for	  purely	  commercial	  purposes	  (and	  it	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  video	  games	  
themselves	  are	  hugely	  commercial	  undertakings);	  but	  like	  in-­‐world	  texting,	  simulations,	  
blogs,	  tweets,	  wikis	  and	  many	  other	  new	  genres	  of	  textual	  production	  in	  the	  social	  software	  
revolution,	  they	  are	  exemplars	  of	  how	  Deweyan	  ‘associated	  thought’	  can	  be	  combined	  with	  
new	  technologies	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  method	  and	  content	  of	  professional	  
learning.	  	  What	  are	  the	  lineaments	  of	  this	  transformation	  for	  legal	  education	  in	  particular?	  	  
They	  are	  characterised	  by	  the	  Level	  two	  categories	  of	  Figure	  1,	  particularly	  the	  four	  boxes	  to	  
the	  left,	  under	  the	  headings	  Experience,	  Ethics,	  Technology	  &	  Collaboration	  (Maharg	  2007).	  	  
All	  four	  concepts	  (which	  of	  course	  express	  value-­‐laden	  approaches	  to	  legal	  education)	  can	  be	  
significantly	  enabled	  and	  enhanced	  by	  the	  use	  of	  appropriate	  technology,	  allied	  to	  
educational,	  moral	  and	  ethical	  theory	  on	  Level	  one,	  and	  when	  embedded	  in	  applications	  
such	  as	  those	  outlined	  at	  Level	  three.	  	  	  
	  
In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  shall	  briefly	  outline	  how	  this	  might	  come	  about	  in	  one	  particular	  
application,	  namely	  simulation.	  	  In	  the	  process	  of	  examining	  how	  such	  an	  approach	  works	  in	  
practice	  we	  shall	  see	  how	  the	  moral	  imagination	  works	  in	  detail	  at	  this	  level	  of	  
implementation,	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  enabled	  by	  the	  mid-­‐level	  theory	  at	  level	  2.	  	  	  
	  
	  CASE	  STUDY	  2:	  Professionalism	  and	  SIMPLE	  –	  associated	  thought	  in	  action	  
This	  case	  study	  is	  a	  curriculum-­‐wide	  implementation	  of	  simulation	  activities	  within	  the	  
Diploma	  in	  Legal	  Practice.	  	  It	  involves	  learning	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  using	  conventional	  print	  
resources,	  and	  also	  involves	  online	  digital	  resources.	  	  While	  the	  use	  of	  the	  web	  to	  simulate	  a	  
professional	  environment	  is	  nothing	  new	  in	  itself,	  our	  implementation	  of	  it	  and	  on	  this	  scale	  
is	  fairly	  unique.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  design	  and	  use	  of	  the	  online	  learning	  environment	  has	  led	  to	  
the	  re-­‐design	  of	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interventions,	  derived	  from	  other	  disciplines,	  which	  are	  unusual	  
in	  legal	  education.	  	  Accompanying	  the	  implementation	  is	  a	  developing	  body	  of	  theory,	  called	  
transactional	  learning	  (Maharg,	  2007b,	  level	  2	  in	  Figure	  1	  above	  ),	  which	  aims	  to	  describe	  
and	  analyse	  forms	  of	  learning	  based	  upon	  all	  professional	  interactions,	  and	  which	  is	  relevant	  
to	  both	  undergraduate	  and	  postgraduate	  courses.	  To	  do	  all	  this,	  we	  developed	  a	  simulation	  
engine,	  called	  SIMPLE,	  which	  would	  enable	  forms	  of	  Deweyan	  education	  to	  be	  enacted	  
within	  a	  regulatory	  structure	  –	  one	  where	  forms	  of	  professional	  learning	  could	  also,	  
conceivably,	  be	  enacted,	  via	  ‘associated	  thought’,	  as	  forms	  of	  democratic	  professionalism.25	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





SIMulated	  Professional	  Learning	  Environment	  (SIMPLE)	  
The	  simulation	  environment	  has	  two	  primary	  software	  outputs,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  SIMPLE	  
platform	  and	  SIMPLE	  tools,	  collectively	  known	  as	  the	  SIMulated	  Professional	  Learning	  
Environment,	  or	  SIMPLE.	  Both	  products	  are	  finished	  to	  beta	  user	  stage.	  	  Each	  of	  these	  
products	  is	  aimed	  at	  different	  areas	  of	  the	  teaching	  eco-­‐system:	  the	  platform	  is	  targeted	  
towards	  students	  &	  staff,	  and	  is	  there	  to	  provide	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  systems	  for	  engaging	  with	  
and	  managing	  simulations.	  The	  tools,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  targeted	  towards	  academic	  or	  
professional	  educators,	  and	  allow	  them	  to	  design	  professional	  simulations	  and	  manage	  all	  of	  
the	  resources	  that	  are	  required	  to	  provide	  an	  engaging	  learning	  experience.	  Both	  open-­‐
source	  products	  are	  available	  to	  the	  FE	  and	  HE	  communities	  free	  at	  point	  of	  use	  at	  
http://simplecommunity.org,	  with	  appropriate	  open-­‐source	  licence	  structures	  in	  place.	  	  	  
	  
The	  SIMPLE	  platform	  is	  web-­‐based,	  allowing	  access	  from	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world	  where	  staff	  
and	  students	  have	  an	  internet	  connection.	  This	  allows	  for	  flexibility	  in	  the	  student	  learning	  
environment	  as	  well	  as	  flexible	  options	  for	  staff	  management	  of	  student	  simulations	  
(enabling	  more	  efficient	  multi-­‐tasking	  in	  administration	  and	  learner	  support).	  We	  have	  made	  




Figure	  2:	  SIMPLE	  student	  environment	  
What	  do	  users	  do	  with	  the	  environment?	  	  Figure	  2	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  environment,	  seen	  
from	  a	  tutor	  point	  of	  view.	  	  Staff	  see	  what	  students	  see,	  but	  with	  added	  functionality	  (staff	  





and	  information).	  	  Students	  use	  the	  environment	  as	  a	  professional	  working	  environment.	  	  
They	  can	  receive,	  send	  and	  store	  documents,	  graphics,	  video	  and	  other	  file	  formats	  by	  
uploading	  them	  to	  the	  environment.	  	  They	  can	  communicate	  with	  real	  or	  fictitious	  persons	  
and	  institutions,	  and	  receive	  feedback	  on	  their	  work	  in-­‐role.	  	  They	  have	  access	  to	  any	  
resources	  that	  staff	  may	  wish	  to	  make	  available	  to	  them;	  they	  can	  share	  tools	  and	  resources.	  	  
They	  have	  access	  to	  a	  map	  of	  a	  fictional	  town	  and	  a	  directory	  (see	  figure	  4	  below).	  	  Using	  the	  
environment,	  students	  can	  build	  up	  the	  correspondence	  and	  drafts	  of	  an	  entire	  transaction,	  
and	  either	  use	  the	  environment	  as	  a	  single	  student,	  or	  as	  part	  of	  a	  collaborative	  grouping.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  difficult	  to	  describe	  briefly	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  simulation	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  students	  
in	  this	  programme-­‐wide	  simulation.	  	  For	  background	  information	  and	  further	  comment	  see	  
Maharg	  (2004a),	  Maharg	  (2006),	  Barton	  &	  Westwood	  (2006),	  Barton	  &	  Maharg	  (2007),	  
Maharg	  (2007)	  and	  Maharg	  &	  Owen	  (2007).	  	  Currently	  at	  Strathclyde,	  students	  on	  the	  
Diploma	  are	  formed	  into	  groups	  of	  four	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  academic	  year,	  each	  one	  being	  a	  
simulated	  law	  firm.	  	  Sited	  on	  the	  south	  bank	  of	  the	  Clyde,	  the	  town	  acts	  as	  a	  complex	  
simulation	  of	  the	  reality	  that	  surrounds	  actual	  legal	  transactions.	  	  For	  example	  in	  the	  
Personal	  Injury	  Negotiation	  Transaction	  (PI),	  the	  firms	  act	  for	  clients,	  either	  the	  injured	  
claimant	  or	  as	  the	  insurance	  company’s	  solicitors,	  in	  a	  personal	  injury	  negotiation	  that	  lasts	  
almost	  a	  full	  semester	  (12	  weeks	  in	  total).	  	  In	  order	  to	  negotiate	  the	  case	  they	  need	  to	  
engage	  in	  fact-­‐finding	  by	  contacting	  characters	  and	  institutions	  within	  the	  virtual	  
community,	  and	  pooling	  the	  information	  they	  obtain.	  	  They	  then	  need	  to	  carry	  out	  legal	  
research	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  liability	  and	  quantum;	  set	  out	  their	  negotiation	  strategy	  and	  
perform	  the	  negotiation,	  either	  by	  email	  or	  through	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  meeting.	  	  Discussion	  
forums	  for	  both	  sides	  support	  students	  in	  the	  complex	  process	  of	  carrying	  out	  this	  legal	  
transaction	  –	  a	  Visiting	  Professor	  who	  is	  a	  PI	  solicitor	  is	  on	  both	  forums	  answered	  student	  
queries	  and	  provided	  information.	  	  Postgraduate	  students,	  trainees	  and	  newly-­‐qualified	  
solicitors	  are	  trained	  to	  answer	  emails	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  any	  one	  of	  around	  12	  different	  fictional	  
characters,	  and	  to	  give	  the	  appropriate	  information	  to	  students.	  	  They	  are	  supported	  by	  an	  
online	  forum	  where	  the	  PI	  practitioner	  is	  present	  (author	  of	  the	  scenario	  and	  many	  
resources).	  	  If	  they	  wish,	  students	  can	  meet	  as	  a	  firm	  with	  either	  this	  tutor	  or	  another	  
negotiation	  tutor	  to	  discuss	  strategy	  and	  performance	  before	  they	  negotiate	  with	  the	  other	  
side.	  	  This	  meeting	  is	  in	  effect	  a	  form	  of	  small-­‐group,	  salon	  learning.	  	  It	  is	  voluntary:	  there	  are	  
no	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interventions	  at	  all,	  apart	  from	  an	  introductory	  and	  general	  feedback	  lecture	  
(students	  can	  also,	  if	  they	  wish,	  obtain	  feedback	  on	  performance	  from	  file	  assessors	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  project).	  
	  
This	  is	  only	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  simulations	  that	  use	  the	  SIMPLE	  environment.	  	  There	  are	  at	  
least	  another	  six	  transactions	  on	  the	  programme.	  	  Nor	  is	  this	  form	  of	  learning	  applicable	  to	  
legal	  professional	  programmes	  only.	  	  It	  has	  been	  used	  successfully	  in	  undergraduate	  law	  
programmes	  at	  Warwick,	  Northumbria	  and	  Glamorgan	  University	  Law	  Schools;	  in	  
postgraduate	  Masters	  programmes	  and	  vocational	  programmes.	  	  It	  is	  not	  jurisdictionally-­‐
specific:	  it	  is	  currently	  being	  used	  by	  the	  Law	  Workshop	  of	  the	  Australian	  National	  
University,	  and	  the	  University	  of	  New	  Hampshire	  Law	  School	  in	  the	  US.	  	  It	  has	  also	  been	  used	  
successfully,	  in	  the	  initial	  JISC/UKCLE	  SIMPLE	  project,	  in	  postgraduate	  Architecture	  and	  
undergraduate	  Management	  Science	  modules.	  
	  
Associated	  thought	  and	  simulation	  
What	  is	  the	  point	  of	  this	  form	  of	  learning,	  and	  what	  part	  does	  the	  moral	  imagination	  play	  in	  
its	  implementation?	  	  On	  a	  surface	  level,	  it	  simulates	  the	  reality	  of	  actual	  transactions.	  	  Note	  





of	  aspects	  of	  it.	  	  This	  allows	  staff	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  transactional	  elements	  that	  students	  may	  
learn	  –	  in	  the	  PI	  transaction,	  for	  instance,	  these	  included	  problem-­‐identification	  and	  solving,	  
the	  integration	  of	  different	  bodies	  of	  substantive	  legal	  knowledge	  (Delict	  [including	  liability	  
and	  quantum],	  Tax,	  Welfare	  Law),	  the	  skills	  of	  negotiation	  formation	  within	  the	  transaction,	  
specific	  forms	  of	  letter-­‐writing,	  and	  time	  management	  of	  the	  transaction,	  negotiation	  
performance,	  and	  client-­‐centred	  lawyering.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  it	  also	  allows	  staff	  to	  create	  open-­‐field	  transactions	  (such	  as	  the	  PI	  transaction)	  
which	  are	  in	  effect	  powerful	  problem-­‐based	  learning	  environments;	  and	  bounded-­‐field	  
transactions	  (such	  as	  Conveyancing,	  where	  we	  supply	  students	  with	  template	  documents,	  
and	  the	  transaction	  is	  much	  more	  linear	  and	  bounded	  by	  custom	  and	  statute)	  –	  see	  Barton	  &	  
Maharg	  (2007)	  for	  more	  information	  on	  this,	  and	  the	  table	  below	  for	  more	  detail	  of	  the	  
distinction	  we	  make.	  
	  
Thirdly,	  it	  allows	  staff	  to	  create	  environments	  that	  are	  both	  zones	  for	  learning	  and	  
assessment	  where	  the	  environments	  are	  powerful	  learning	  and	  testing	  grounds	  for	  
contested	  value-­‐constellations	  such	  as	  professionalism.	  	  Such	  values,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  from	  
research	  into	  the	  forms	  of	  education	  that	  best	  fit	  cultures	  of	  professional	  activity,	  do	  not	  fit	  
easily	  into	  the	  structures	  of	  academic	  assessment	  (Stern	  &	  Papadakis	  2006).	  	  Above	  all,	  this	  
approach	  avoids	  the	  damaging	  separation	  of	  learning	  from	  assessment	  that	  often	  occurs	  in	  
conventional	  academic	  learning.	  	  	  
	  
Fourthly,	  in	  examining	  the	  work	  of	  professionals	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  real	  professional	  life	  is	  about	  
integration	  of	  knowledge	  into	  contexts	  that	  are	  changing	  continuously.	  That	  knowledge	  
becomes	  valuable	  when	  it	  is	  contextualised	  in	  the	  narratives	  of	  professional	  experience.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  considerable	  difference	  in	  emphasis	  in	  the	  notion	  and	  techniques	  required	  for	  
professional	  development	  as	  compared	  to	  a	  technical	  approach	  to	  training.	  Professional	  
education	  requires	  judgement	  rather	  than	  simple	  answers.	  This	  has	  been	  well	  articulated	  by	  
Bevis	  &	  Watson	  (1990),	  who	  compared	  a	  technical	  model	  against	  a	  professional	  model	  for	  
clinical	  nurse	  education	  (see	  Table	  1).	  The	  language	  of	  their	  comparison	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  
Dzur,	  and	  is	  close	  to	  the	  antinomies	  of	  Stronach	  et	  al,	  and	  to	  the	  anxieties	  about	  the	  nature	  
of	  professional	  society	  that	  go	  back	  to	  Ferguson	  and	  Scottish	  Enlightenment	  discourse.	  	  We	  
would	  argue	  that	  approaches	  such	  as	  SIMPLE	  simulations	  allow	  us	  shift	  educational	  practice	  
much	  more	  to	  the	  professional	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  than	  to	  the	  technical	  end.	  
	  
Technical	  Model	  	   Professional	  Model	  	  
The	  only	  learning	  worth	  evaluating	  can	  
be	  seen	  as	  behavioural	  changes.	  	  
Worthwhile	  learning	  is	  often	  personal,	  
obscure	  and	  private.	  Only	  some	  learning	  
appears	  as	  behavioural	  changes.	  	  
Everything	  that	  exists,	  exists	  in	  some	  
quantity,	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  counted	  
and	  measured.	  	  
Many	  things	  that	  exist	  are	  note	  externally	  
verifiable.	  	  
The	  teacher-­‐selected	  goals	  are	  the	  
important	  ones,	  therefore	  the	  evaluated	  
ones.	  	  Both	  teacher	  and	  student	  selected	  
Important,	  therefore	  the	  evaluates	  ones	  	  
Both	  teacher	  and	  student	  selected	  goals	  are	  
important,	  as	  is	  learning	  attained	  without	  
goals.	  	  
Comparing	  behaviours	  to	  some	  
objectively	  held	  criteria	  or	  comparing	  to	  
Educative	  learning	  cannot	  be	  rated	  on	  a	  





the	  progress	  of	  other	  students	  
determines	  how	  well	  something	  is	  
learned.	  	  
either	  to	  some	  "objectively"	  conceived	  
criteria	  or	  to	  the	  progress	  of	  other	  
students.	  	  
The	  teacher-­‐student	  relationship	  is	  
hierarchical	  and	  the	  teachers	  assess	  
students	  by	  how	  well	  they	  have	  met	  
specific	  objectives.	  	  
The	  teacher-­‐student	  relationship	  is	  
egalitarian.	  Learning	  requires	  a	  process	  of	  
trusting	  grades	  to	  exploration	  among	  
expert	  and	  novice	  learners	  and	  thrives	  on	  
constructive	  criticism.	  
The	  quality	  of	  rigour	  of	  a	  course	  can	  be	  
determined	  by	  how	  well	  it	  helps	  its	  
students	  meet	  the	  discipline	  
requirements	  as	  reflected	  by	  test	  scores,	  
attainment	  of	  behavioural	  objectives,	  
and	  accreditation	  requirements,	  since	  
these	  reflect	  the	  agreed-­‐upon	  discipline	  
content.	  	  
The	  quality	  of	  rigour	  of	  a	  course	  can	  be	  
determined	  by	  how	  well	  it	  helps	  students	  
collect	  paradigm	  experiences,	  develop	  
insights,	  see	  patterns,	  find	  meanings	  in	  
ideas	  and	  experiences,	  explore	  creative	  
modes	  of	  enquiry,	  examine	  assumptions,	  
form	  values	  and	  ethics	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  
moral	  ideal	  of	  the	  caring	  scholar-­‐clinician,	  
respond	  to	  social	  needs,	  live	  fully	  and	  
advance	  the	  profession.	  
Table	  1:	  Technical	  and	  professional	  models	  (Bevis	  &	  Watson,	  1990,	  cited	  Maharg	  &	  Owen,	  2007)	  
	  
How	  does	  simulation	  manage	  to	  do	  this?	  	  Put	  simply,	  it	  allows	  for	  a	  creative	  space,	  a	  middle	  
domain	  of	  playful	  activity	  where	  the	  moral	  imagination	  is,	  in	  a	  Hutchesonian	  sense,	  
encouraged	  to	  play.	  	  Students	  play	  roles,	  have	  the	  space	  to	  take	  up	  traits	  and	  characters	  that	  
are	  not	  (yet)	  disciplined	  by	  the	  Weberian	  cage	  of	  professional	  practice	  reality,	  and	  can	  
develop	  the	  play	  of	  imaginative	  sympathy,	  amongst	  other	  emotions,	  within	  their	  learning	  
and	  their	  work.	  	  	  
	  
Or	  not.	  	  For	  there	  is	  a	  body	  of	  work	  carried	  out	  by	  Barton	  &	  Westwood	  that	  analyses	  how,	  in	  
terms	  of	  learning	  and	  trust,	  the	  collaborative	  relationship	  is	  enacted	  in	  the	  simulation	  
environment,	  how	  the	  ecology	  of	  that	  environment	  can	  shape	  student	  learning,	  and	  how	  
students	  themselves	  shape	  it	  (Barton	  &	  Westwood,	  2006;	  2011).	  	  Analyzing	  individual	  
reflective	  reports	  that	  GGSL	  students	  wrote	  on	  their	  experience	  of	  working	  in	  firms,	  they	  
drew	  up	  a	  matrix	  the	  axes	  of	  which	  were	  composed	  of	  learning	  and	  trust,	  with	  student	  firms	  
plotted	  into	  one	  of	  four	  quadrants	  –	  high	  learning,	  high	  trust	  (‘Learning	  Communities’);	  high	  
learning,	  low	  trust	  (‘Legal	  Eagles’);	  low	  learning,	  high	  trust	  (‘Friendly	  Societies’),	  and	  low	  
learning,	  low	  trust	  (‘Dysfunctional’	  firms).26	  	  The	  traits	  of	  the	  quadrants	  are	  illustrated	  in	  
Figure	  3.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Type	  2:	  Legal	  Eagles	  	  
Low	  Trust	  High	  Learning	  	  
Culture	  
Suspicious,	  blame,	  independence,	  me	  first,	  
team	  second	  
Task	  
Task	  focused:	  debate	  about	  details,	  my	  
way;	  high	  engagement,	  exhausting	  
Relationships	  
Insular,	  abrasive,	  reluctant,	  limited	  
listening,	  suspicious	  
Work	  styles	  	  




Type	  1:	  Learning	  Community	  	  
High	  Trust	  High	  Learning	  	  
Culture	  
Inclusive,	  fair,	  interdependence,	  team	  first,	  
win-­‐win	  
Task	  
Task	  focussed:	  our	  way;	  high	  engagement	  
to	  get	  things	  done,	  good	  communications	  	  
Relationships	  
Open,	  value	  each	  other,	  mutually	  
supportive,	  honest,	  shared	  responsibility,	  
respect	  
Work	  styles	  	  
Flexible,	  adaptive,	  learn	  from	  mistakes,	  
consensus,	  responsive,	  resilient	  	  
	  
Type	  4:	  Dysfunctional	  	  
Low	  Trust	  Low	  Learning	  	  
Culture	  
Suspicious,	  blame,	  ego-­‐centred,	  me	  first,	  
firm	  nowhere	  
Task	  
Not	  task	  focussed;	  low	  engagement	  
Relationships	  
Blame,	  victimisation,	  polarised,	  abrasive,	  
no	  self-­‐awareness	  
Work	  styles	  	  
Inflexible,	  superficial,	  dictatorial,	  rigid	  
Type	  3:	  Friendly	  Societies	  	  	  	  
High	  Trust	  Low	  Learning	  	  
Culture	  
Inclusive,	  cosy,	  dependence,	  friends	  first,	  
firm	  second	  
Task	  
Not	  task	  focussed;	  low	  engagement	  
Relationships	  
Like	  minded,	  sociable,	  nice,	  supportive	  
Work	  styles	  	  
Superficial,	  majority,	  avoid	  conflict	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Learning/Trust	  matrix	  (Barton	  &	  Westwood,	  2006)	  
	  
According	  to	  their	  analyses	  the	  student	  firms	  achieved	  most	  in	  terms	  of	  academic	  and	  
professional	  practice	  when	  they	  were	  in	  the	  Learning	  Community	  quadrant;	  but	  the	  first	  
study	  in	  2003/4	  revealed	  a	  relatively	  high	  proportion	  of	  problematic	  traits	  in	  the	  formation	  
of	  group	  dynamics,	  the	  emotional	  resilience	  of	  groupwork,	  and	  many	  other	  issues	  (see	  Table	  
3).	  	  Clearly,	  GGSL	  staff	  wanted	  as	  many	  students	  as	  possible	  to	  be	  in	  the	  Learning	  
Community.	  	  In	  our	  view,	  and	  given	  our	  concept	  of	  Deweyan	  civic	  professionalism	  as	  well	  as	  
our	  sense	  of	  the	  role	  of	  sympathy	  and	  feeling	  in	  collaborative	  work,	  this	  was	  where	  not	  only	  
the	  most	  significant	  achievement	  took	  place,	  but	  where	  students	  learned	  best	  the	  ideals	  of	  a	  
democratic	  professionalism.	  	  Correspondingly,	  we	  wanted	  Legal	  Eagles	  to	  be	  less	  suspicious	  
with	  each	  other,	  more	  trusting;	  the	  Friendly	  Societies	  to	  be	  less	  friendly	  and	  more	  task-­‐
focused,	  and	  the	  Dysfunctional	  firms	  to	  give	  more	  time	  to	  the	  intra-­‐firm	  relationship	  itself,	  
and	  seek	  help	  where	  required.	  	  	  
	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  GGSL	  team	  implemented	  a	  number	  of	  changes	  to	  the	  context	  of	  the	  firm	  
environment	  on	  the	  programme.	  	  One	  of	  the	  changes	  was	  the	  development	  of	  a	  partnership	  
contract	  amongst	  the	  firm	  members.	  	  Early	  in	  the	  programme	  the	  contract	  was	  drawn	  up	  on	  
a	  template	  but	  the	  firms	  were	  asked	  to	  choose	  at	  least	  four	  values	  from	  a	  total	  of	  31	  that	  






document.	  	  The	  document	  was	  then	  executed	  formally	  and	  witnessed	  by	  their	  Practice	  
Manager,	  a	  member	  of	  staff.	  	  The	  values	  chosen	  by	  firms	  were	  tracked	  by	  staff.	  	  The	  most	  
popular	  was	  reliability,	  with	  work-­‐life	  balance	  second,	  and	  integrity	  and	  quality	  the	  third.	  	  
What	  was	  interesting,	  however	  was	  the	  next	  most	  popular	  constellation:	  democracy,	  
happiness,	  challenge	  and	  excellence,	  particularly	  when	  balanced	  against	  the	  values	  that	  were	  
unused	  by	  any	  agreement,	  namely	  change,	  competition,	  freedom,	  friendships,	  independence,	  
leadership,	  privacy	  and	  status	  (Barton	  &	  Westwood,	  2011,	  XXX).	  	  When	  given	  the	  choice,	  
students	  chose	  what	  must	  surely	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  more	  Hutchesonian	  constellation	  of	  
values.	  	  	  
	  
The	  partnership	  agreement,	  formed	  and	  executed	  during	  the	  initial	  Foundation	  Course	  of	  
the	  Diploma,	  was	  used	  in	  subsequent	  sessions	  with	  Practice	  Managers	  (staff	  who	  had	  been	  
given	  special	  training	  to	  be	  coaches,	  rather	  than	  tutors,	  to	  the	  student	  firms).	  	  Students	  and	  
Practice	  Managers	  found	  it	  a	  helpful	  document	  because	  it	  clarified	  the	  commitment	  the	  
firm’s	  members	  had	  made	  to	  themselves	  and	  to	  each	  other.	  	  It	  also	  functioned,	  in	  Gee’s	  
terms,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ‘affinity	  space’,	  and	  as	  such,	  contributed	  to	  the	  play	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  
and	  the	  moral	  imagination	  precisely	  because	  it	  was	  part	  role-­‐play,	  part	  reality,	  a	  mesocosmic	  
area	  where	  learning	  was	  enhanced	  precisely	  because	  it	  took	  place	  neither	  in	  one	  zone	  nor	  
the	  other	  entirely.	  	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  whole	  approach	  of	  the	  simulated	  firm	  environment,	  
with	  its	  values	  chosen	  in	  part	  by	  students,	  replicates	  the	  situations	  of	  players	  in	  online	  
games	  who	  choose	  their	  character	  –	  dwarf,	  elf,	  healer,	  warrior,	  for	  instance.	  	  The	  latest	  
games	  are	  more	  sophisticated.	  	  In	  The	  Secret	  World,	  for	  example,	  players	  are	  not	  species-­‐
specific:	  they	  are	  given	  the	  choice	  of	  seven	  active	  and	  seven	  passive	  abilities,	  and	  re-­‐
organize	  these	  when	  they	  wish.	  	  As	  has	  often	  been	  observed,	  these	  games	  are	  powerful	  
tools	  for	  imaginative	  play	  (de	  Freitas	  &	  Maharg,	  2011;	  Gee,	  2004;	  Juul,	  2005;	  Taylor,	  2006).	  
	  
The	  partnership	  agreement	  and	  other	  tools	  also	  helped	  students	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  local	  as	  the	  
ground	  of	  professional	  value	  –	  a	  process	  that	  is	  identified	  in	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  literature	  
on	  professionalism	  as	  an	  important	  influence	  upon	  the	  development	  of	  ethical	  practice.	  	  
Discussing	  the	  whole	  process	  by	  which	  the	  ABA	  had	  developed	  its	  Model	  Rules	  for	  
Professional	  Conduct,	  for	  instance,	  Schneyer	  argued	  against	  earlier	  critical	  theories	  about	  
the	  provenance	  and	  signficance	  of	  professional	  ethics	  codes,	  and	  for	  a	  view	  of	  the	  Model	  
Rules	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  de	  facto	  law-­‐making	  by	  a	  private	  group.	  	  He	  constructed	  what	  he	  
termed	  ‘professionalism-­‐in-­‐fact’	  –	  a	  matrix	  of	  common	  themes	  by	  which	  lawyers	  thought	  
about	  the	  field	  of	  legal	  ethics	  –	  and	  sited	  this	  in	  the	  diversity	  and	  pluralism	  of	  lawyers’	  
practices,	  arguing	  that	  the	  roots	  of	  lawyers’	  ethical	  preoccupations	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
circumstances	  of	  their	  particular	  practices.	  
	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  changes,	  charted	  in	  2005/6	  (Table	  3	  below),	  showed	  the	  significant	  
improvement	  in	  student	  achievement.	  	  Compared	  against	  2003/4,	  the	  results	  of	  2005/6	  
showed	  fewer	  Legal	  Eagle	  and	  Friendly	  Society	  types	  of	  firms,	  and	  a	  significant	  reduction	  in	  
the	  number	  of	  Dysfunctional	  firms	  and	  a	  corresponding	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  Learning	  
Community	  firms.	  	  It	  is	  significant	  that	  the	  results	  of	  2004/5,	  the	  year	  when	  the	  interventions	  
(including	  the	  partnership	  agreement)	  were	  being	  planned,	  broadly	  replicated	  the	  results	  of	  
the	  previous	  year	  in	  type	  1	  and	  4	  firms.	  	  Since	  then,	  the	  2005/6	  results	  have	  been	  
maintained.	  	  	  
	  






Type	  1	  	  
Learning	  






Type	  2	  	  
Legal	  Eagles	  	  
27%	   14%	   18%	  
Type	  3	  	  
Friendly	  Society	  
20%	   31%	   18%	  
Type	  4	  	  
Dysfunctional	  	  
12%	   13%	   8%	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Comparison	  of	  firm	  characteristics	  (adapted,	  Barton	  &	  Westwood,	  2011,	  XXX).	  
	  
Conclusion	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  argued	  for	  situated	  forms	  of	  educational	  praxis	  as	  one	  way	  in	  which	  we	  
can	  exercise	  the	  play	  of	  imagination,	  and	  direct	  it	  towards	  some	  of	  the	  critical	  debates	  about	  
professionalism	  in	  our	  society.	  	  It	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  professionalism	  is	  too	  narrow	  a	  
concept	  for	  the	  expansive	  values	  of	  Hutcheson,	  Dewey	  and	  others	  I	  have	  cited	  in	  this	  
chapter;	  and	  it	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  is	  sited	  in	  variants	  of	  
professional	  technicism.	  	  But	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  as	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  professional	  classes,	  it	  
requires	  recuperation	  and	  renewal,	  along	  the	  lines	  set	  out	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  The	  alternative,	  
as	  Dzur	  and	  others	  point	  out,	  is	  the	  triumph	  of	  narrow	  technocratic	  definitions	  of	  the	  
concept	  by	  those	  with	  powerful	  interests	  to	  affect	  legal	  education,	  such	  as	  regulators	  and	  
policymakers.	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  debate	  about	  an	  expansive	  version	  of	  professionalism	  is	  nothing	  new.	  	  
It	  only	  appears	  new	  because	  we	  have	  forgotten	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  term’s	  larger	  cultural,	  social	  
and	  philosophical	  context	  –	  a	  context	  that	  we	  can	  appreciate	  in	  the	  discourse	  of	  
Enlightenment	  critiques	  of	  social	  theory	  and	  praxis,	  where	  imagination,	  through	  aesthetic	  
activity	  in	  everyday	  life,	  impels	  the	  moral	  sense.	  
	  
In	  the	  forms	  of	  situated	  learning	  described	  above	  students	  learn	  much	  more	  than	  the	  mere	  
mechanics	  of	  professional	  practice.	  	  They	  also	  learn	  about	  their	  own	  developing	  associative	  
life	  in	  a	  profession.	  	  The	  immersive	  groupwork	  of	  the	  virtual	  firm	  in	  SIMPLE	  becomes	  a	  
microcosm,	  a	  sandbox	  for	  working	  practices,	  habits	  and	  attitudes	  that	  can	  function	  as	  a	  
critique	  of	  legal	  practice.	  	  The	  affinity	  space	  of	  SIMPLE	  is	  a	  profound	  example	  of	  the	  use	  of	  
technology	  as	  a	  form	  of	  education	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  democratic	  professionalism,	  advocated	  by	  
Dewey,	  practised	  in	  his	  Laboratory	  School,	  and	  throughout	  his	  work.	  	  It	  is	  also	  an	  educational	  
initiative	  that	  attempts	  to	  go	  beyond	  text-­‐focused	  heuristics	  by	  providing	  collaborative,	  
learning	  spaces	  that	  enable	  students	  to	  explore	  and	  engage	  in	  imaginative	  ways	  with	  
identity,	  fitness,	  responsibility,	  decision-­‐making,	  ethics	  and	  many	  other	  concepts	  vital	  to	  
their	  learning	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  fully	  professional.	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Appendix:	  PEAT	  1	  Professionalism	  Learning	  Outcomes	  (Law	  Society	  of	  Scotland)	  
The	  full	  set	  of	  learning	  outcomes	  for	  PEAT	  1	  is	  available	  at	  









programme a student 
should demonstrate a 
commitment to: 
Positive indicators Appropriate forms of assessment 
1. The interests of justice 
and democracy in 
society 
Displays an interest in the 
workings of justice in society; has 
an ethical awareness of legal 
practice, and a developing sense 
of the regulatory framework of 
professional ethics.  Shows 
awareness of his or her 
responsibility to improve the 
capacity of legal institutions and 
process. 
Best assessed longitudinally throughout 
the programme, by more than one 
assessor, and in more than one 
assessment, so that a variety of views 
are obtained under different conditions.  
Providers should be under an obligation 
to inform the Society of students who 
obtain problematic scores in any of the 
minor domains.   
 
Forms of assessment could include: 
1. Client-based long case 
2. Case file review of simulated 
client file 
3. Portfolio – self-assessment 
4. Log book/activity 
log/confidential file 
5. Critical incident review 
6. Peer-review 
7. Transactional assessment 
8. Tutor reports 
2. Effective and competent 
legal services on behalf 
of a client 
Updates and expands knowledge 
of the law, knowledge of legal 
practice, client-centred practice 
and management of client 
service.  Pays careful attention to 
standard of detail in legal work; 
evaluates own client care; 
appraises new forms of client 
care and adopts improvements; 
acts quickly to protect clients and 
the public from risk. 
3. Continuing professional 
education and personal 
development 
Is aware of own strengths and 
weaknesses and forms plans to 
develop character, values, 
knowledge and skills throughout 
the course. 
4. Diversity and public 
service 
Shows an awareness of the 
importance of equality of access 
to and participation in legal 
services regardless of culture, 
race, religion, gender, disability; 
assists in the training of new 
lawyers through peer learning 
and training of undergraduate 
students or other groups in 
society. 
5. Personal integrity and 
civility towards 
colleagues, clients and 
the courts 
Is honest with all others on the 
course; relates to colleagues on 
the programme with civility; treats 
tutors, administrative staff and 
others with respect. 
 
